EPIDEMICS, OUTSIDERS, AND LOCAL PROTECTION:
FEDERALISM THEATER IN THE ERA OF THE SHOTGUN QUARANTINE
Polly J. Price∗
Litigation has begun over restrictive quarantines imposed during the recent Ebola scare. Alleging
excessive political interference, these lawsuits raise questions about state and local quarantine
authority. It is widely assumed that states have absolute control over public health threats within
their boundaries. This article suggests that the presumption of limited federal authority within
states is overly restrictive and not constitutionally mandated.
The history of the “shotgun quarantine” during the yellow fever epidemics of the late nineteenth
century led to protracted debate about the federal government’s ability to preempt or abrogate
unnecessary, over-reaching quarantines imposed by local governments. The human suffering and
disruption to commerce caused by the local shotgun quarantine led the South to implore Congress
for legislation to remedy it – a significant instance in which the post-Civil War South united in
favor of ceding state’s rights to the federal government. The controversy faded as effective measures
against yellow fever were found. Because Congress never acted, we have largely forgotten these legal
debates.
In recovering that history, this Article offers a new perspective not only on the protection of public
health in our federal system, but also on state protectionism generally and the exclusion of outside
threats from local communities. The yellow fever “shotgun quarantine” tested our constitutional
structure for response to public health emergencies, and found it wanting
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INTRODUCTION
There can be no question as to the suffering in the State of Mississippi.
Half the towns and cities have quarantined themselves against the living
world. . . . Around villages are cordons of armed men, ready to shoot
down the first invader. Traffic has been extinguished. Hundreds if not
thousands of laborers have been thrown out of employment. . . . How
1
much longer will the Southern States continue in this madness?

In September 1897, Oscar Wilson attempted to return to his home in
Meridian, Mississippi. He had traveled to Nashville, Tennessee, to consult a
physician about a bone tumor in his shin. But a “shotgun quarantine”
interrupted his return rail journey near the Mississippi state line. Oscar was
compelled to leave the train at Livingston, Alabama, and, as his money ran
out, he had to walk some thirty-five miles to his home, where his leg was

1

Fruits of Local Quarantine, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1898, at 6.
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amputated. Like countless others caught up in the epidemic, Oscar had no
symptoms of yellow fever, nor had he traveled from any area where yellow
fever was present. No matter; with threat of force, Mississippi had
2
quarantined itself against the world.
From the 1870s through the first decade of the twentieth century, local
governments throughout the South defended their towns against epidemic
disease by imposing a form of quarantine by martial law, popularly known as
the “shotgun quarantine.” Facing the annual terror of yellow fever, armed
men guarded their towns to prevent the entry of persons from anywhere
yellow fever might be present.
Shotgun quarantines halted trains, devastated commerce, and imposed
misery for thousands of refugees. State governments attempted to end local
shotgun quarantines but could not do so. As state legislative efforts to
control local shotgun quarantines failed, southern politicians and business
leaders turned to Congress for federal aid.
For nearly four decades, the shotgun quarantine set the terms of debate
over the constitutional authority of the national government to manage
epidemics. Congress explored whether the federal government had the
authority to override state and local quarantines in order to prevent the
wider harm these actions imposed on the region. Could the national
government veto quarantines authorized by lower levels of government and
which were viewed to be unnecessary?
Fast-forward to the present. Litigation has begun over quarantines
3
imposed by state governments during the recent Ebola scare. Four state
governors imposed far stricter quarantines within their states than the CDC
and medical experts recommended, leading to charges of excessive political
4
grandstanding in the face of unreasonable public fear. Although relatively
few persons experienced these restrictive quarantines, the episode has set
precedent for future public health emergencies. State and local public
health measures, when unnecessary and fueled by local politics, could cause
disproportionate harm on a much wider scale.
This was the problem posed by the shotgun quarantine in the South.
The public response to the nineteenth-century shotgun quarantine provides

2
3

4

See Wilson v. Ala. G.S.R. Co., 28 So. 567 (Miss. 1900) (differentiating between an
ostensibly reasonable quarantine and the overzealous quarantine actually in place).
See Sheri Fink, Connecticut Faces Lawsuit over Ebola Quarantines, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2016, at
A20; Justin Wm. Moyer, Kaci Hickox, Rebel Ebola Nurse Loathed by Conservatives, Sues Chris
Christie over Quarantine, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2015/10/23/kaci-hickox-rebel-ebola-nurse-loathed-by-conservati
ves-sues-chris-christie-over-quarantine/; see also ACLU and Yale Global Health Justice
Partnership, Fear, Politics, and Ebola: How Quarantines Hurt the Fight Against Ebola and Violate
the Constitution (Dec. 2015), https://www.aclu.org/report/fear-politics-and-ebola.
See infra Part IV.B.
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a window into developments in constitutional federalism, municipal and
state government relationships, the police power of the state, and martial
law. The legislative debates exploring the boundaries of state and federal
authority centered around and reacted to the shotgun quarantine, but the
underlying principles at issue echo far more broadly. At least three U.S.
Presidents and many members of Congress believed the federal government
had the authority to override a state-imposed quarantine.5 But federal
legislative efforts to control the shotgun quarantine failed, and the question
has never been tested in court.
The federal government’s quarantine authority remains ambiguous
today. The modern federal government in the United States has interstate
6
quarantine authority by statute, but what does that really mean? Prior
accounts have not considered the yellow fever scares of the late nineteenth
century as a key development in public health federalism. Furthermore,
scholars have been insufficiently attentive to the fact that states and
municipalities could legally prevent the movement of commerce and large
numbers of people. Whether the federal government could remedy the
situation occupied Congress for nearly three decades.
There are some surprising results. A contemporary noted that the South
“had been impelled by the ravages of the yellow scourge to forget their
extremes State’s rights theories and become champions of placing in the
hands of the federal government far greater powers than it had hitherto
7
exercised for the purpose of protecting the public health.” When southern
states did ask for federal intervention, it was because they could not control
independent-minded local governments even within their own states, let
alone trust other states to control theirs.
While the days of the shotgun quarantine are in the distant past, the
threat of widespread epidemics is not. Congress came close to authorizing a
8
federal override of any state or local inland quarantine, and the debates
about this possibility teach much about how the participants understood
constitutional structure (the Commerce Clause in particular), and the
powers of state and local political institutions and agencies. In the end,
however, no legislature—state or federal—was able to lay the shotgun
quarantine to rest. Instead, the controversy faded as effective measures
against yellow fever were found. But this history is of relevance in modern

5
6

7
8

See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
See Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION
(Aug.
2015),
http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolation.html
(summarizing legal definitions and authorities for federally-enacted quarantines).
Edwin Maxey, Federal Quarantine Laws, 43 AM. L. REV. 382, 388–89 (1909).
See infra Parts III.C, III.D.
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public health emergencies. The protection of public health has not been
viewed consistently as subject to the federal government’s powers under the
Commerce Clause, particularly the “dormant” variety.
Currently, the common view is that the federal government may
interfere with a state’s or municipality’s choice to impose population-based
quarantine restrictions only when a state asks for assistance, or when it fails
9
to act to prevent an epidemic crossing state lines. I suggest this belief is a
misunderstanding derived from inaction in the past. Federal authority here
is inherent and is not structurally limited by the U.S. Constitution, and
indeed is supported by, among others, a constitutional “right to travel” and
the Dormant Commerce Cause. There should be a federal role to preempt
or override unnecessary state and local geographic quarantines. The need
for regulatory standards and clear federal authority remains,
notwithstanding the distant era of the shotgun quarantine. In recovering
that history, this Article offers a new perspective not only on the protection
of public health in our federal system, but also on state protectionism and
the exclusion of outside threats from local communities.

I.

YELLOW FEVER AND THE SHOTGUN QUARANTINE

City is barricaded against city, town against town, and village against
village . . . the channels of commerce are dammed, and the entire
country in which the barbarous embargo is operated is given over to
chaos, hardship, and frenzied fear.
These assumptions of dictatorship over everything terrestial [sic] by every
little community . . . against all the people on earth who reside outside
10
their community limits, have been carried to ruinous lengths.
11

Yellow fever is an acute disease with a high mortality rate. It is marked
by a rapid onset of symptoms—bleeding from the mouth, nose, and copious

9

10

Indeed, recent scholarship emphasizes the inability of states, acting alone, to effectively
respond to a major epidemic without federal assistance and coordination. See, e.g., John
Thomas Clarkson, Phase Six Pandemic: A Call to Re-Evaluate Federal Quarantine Authority
Before the Next Catastrophic Outbreak, 44 GA. L. REV. 803, 807–13 (2010) (describing the
ability of the federal government to respond to a public health emergency); Wendy E.
Parmet, After September 11: Rethinking Public Health Federalism, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 201
(2002) (exploring the Commerce Clause and police power of states). Such authority is
already provided by statute if a state fails, or is unable, to take effective measures against
interstate spread of disease. This proposition is not really controversial as a constitutional
matter. Instead, this Article examines what can be considered the opposite problem: a
state or local government engages in protectionism (economic or political) beyond the
necessity to do so, disrupting commerce and the movement of persons, among other
harms to national interest.
The Foolish Shotgun Quarantine, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1897, at 6.
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amounts of “black vomit,” with delirium from high fever and jaundice
12
turning the skin yellow prior to death. Yellow fever is not endemic to the
United States but can be imported from areas where it is. Both Ebola and
yellow fever are subject to federal quarantine for persons entering the
13
United States.
The International Health Regulations place special
14
significance on vaccination against yellow fever.
As is well-documented by historians, yellow fever periodically wreaked
havoc in the South over many decades, especially during the post-Civil War
15
period through the early twentieth century. The disease had an especially
high mortality rate and proved able to evade ship quarantine and
16
disinfection measures.

A. Epidemics in the South, 1878–1905
The South notoriously had the worst health in the nation throughout
17
the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. Poverty and
geography played a primary role. Hookworm, pellagra, and malaria were
among the health problems retarding economic growth, such that FDR in

11

See JOHN R. PIERCE & JIM WRITER, YELLOW JACK: HOW YELLOW FEVER RAVAGED AMERICA
1, 7 (2005).
Id.
See 42 C.F.R. § 71 (2012) (providing for the prevention of “the introduction,
transmission, and spread of communicable disease from foreign countries”, as well as
designating yellow fever vaccination centers); Exec. Order No. 13,295, 68 Fed. Reg.
17,255 (Apr. 9, 2003), as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,375, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,299 (Apr. 5,
2005) (extending coverage to potentially pandemic-causing influenza viruses); Legal
Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Aug.
2015),
http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolation.html
(summarizing legal definitions and authorities for federally enacted quarantines).
See International Health Regulations, WORLD HEALTH ORG., International Certificate of
Vaccination or Prophylaxis (2005), http://www.who.int/ihr/ports_airports/icvp/en.
See generally KHALED J. BLOOM, THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY’S GREAT YELLOW FEVER EPIDEMIC
OF 1878 (1993); JO ANN CARRIGAN, THE SAFFRON SCOURGE: A HISTORY OF YELLOW FEVER
IN LOUISIANA, 1796–1905 (1994); MOLLY CALDWELL CROSBY, THE AMERICAN PLAGUE: THE
UNTOLD STORY OF YELLOW FEVER, THE EPIDEMIC THAT SHAPED OUR HISTORY (2006); JOHN
DUFFY, SWORD OF PESTILENCE: THE NEW ORLEANS YELLOW FEVER EPIDEMIC OF 1853
(1966); JOHN H. ELLIS, YELLOW FEVER AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE NEW SOUTH (1992);
DEANNE STEPHENS NUWER, PLAGUE AMONG THE MAGNOLIAS: THE 1878 YELLOW FEVER
EPIDEMIC IN MISSISSIPPI (2009); PIERCE & WRITER, supra note 11; MARGARET HUMPHREYS,
YELLOW FEVER AND THE SOUTH (1992).
BLOOM, supra note 15, at 30–32; George Sternberg, Yellow Fever and Quarantine, Public
Health Papers and Reports, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, at 351–57 (1880),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2272542/.
James O. Breeden, Disease as a Factor in Southern Distinctiveness, in DISEASE AND
DISTINCTIVENESS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 8–10, 12–13 (Todd L. Savitt & James Harvey
Young eds., 1988) (specifying certain phenomena and diseases as being particularly
precipitous in causing the South to lag far behind the rest of the country as a result of the
lack of health safety throughout the region).
AND WALTER REED DISCOVERED ITS DEADLY SECRETS

12
13

14
15

16

17
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1938 famously labeled the South “the nation’s No. 1 economic problem.”
But even though malaria and other diseases caused more deaths in the
southern region, yellow fever was more terrifying, causing widespread panic
wherever it appeared.
Following the American Revolution, points to the north were hit hard by
yellow fever (particularly Philadelphia in 1793), but by the mid-nineteenth
19
century yellow fever had become primarily a southern phenomenon. For
over fifty years in the era following the Civil War, annual visitations of yellow
fever in the South were predictable. Starting in late spring, people feared
yellow fever’s appearance through the end of the “season,” generally the first
20
frost.
The Texas governor, for example, issued annual proclamations
authorizing quarantine when and where yellow fever appeared, effective
21
April 1 of each year.
Why did yellow fever subside in the North after 1800? Although seaports
along the North Atlantic coast employed stringent port quarantine measures
throughout the nineteenth century, the shift of yellow fever to southern
regions did not necessarily reflect a superiority of quarantine method.
Instead, the nature of commerce had changed. Mercantile traffic from the
Caribbean – yellow fever points of origin – shifted markedly to southern
22
rather than northern ports.
Major epidemics originating in southern port cities occurred in 1878,
1897, and 1905. The 1878 epidemic alone is estimated to have stricken
120,000 people, resulting in at least 20,000 deaths in the region and “a
23
pecuniary loss of not less than 100 million dollars.” The entire Mississippi
River Valley from St. Louis south was affected. Tens of thousands fled the
24
stricken cities of New Orleans, Vicksburg, and Memphis.
Similarly, the
1897 outbreak affected nine states and caused cities and towns throughout
25
the region to impose shotgun quarantines.
The 1905 epidemic was
18

19
20
21
22

23
24
25

Louis Stark, South Is Declared ‘No. 1’ by President in Economic Need, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1938,
at 1. Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Members of the Conference on
Economic Conditions in the South (July 5, 1938), in NATIONAL EMERGENCY COUNCIL,
REPORT ON ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE SOUTH, 1–2 (1938) (requesting a report from
the various government agencies on what the President describes as “the Nation’s
problem”).
See K. David Patterson, Yellow Fever Epidemics and Mortality in the United States, 1693–1905,
34 SOC. SCI. & MED. 855, 856 (1992).
See Waiting for Frost, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1879, at 1; NUWER, supra note 15, at 19.
Judgments Must Be Paid, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 23, 1901, at 3.
Round Table Discussion on Yellow Fever, PBS: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (Sept. 29, 2006)
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/fever/sfeature/experts.html (explaining that the
“main factor in yellow fever’s spread in the nineteenth century [had] to do with shipping
and commerce from the tropics”).
See PIERCE & WRITER, supra note 11, at 69; see also Maxey, supra note 7, at 387–88.
See HUMPHREYS, supra note 15, at 137–38.
Id.
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America’s last major outbreak, for reasons that are not entirely clear. All
told, in the nineteenth century yellow fever is believed to have killed 100,000
27
Americans, with three-quarters of the deaths occurring after 1805. Given
unreliable data, one historian has suggested the total “could well be 150,000
28
or more.”
Yellow fever was such a prominent annual risk that life insurance
companies included a standard clause voiding the policy if the insured
traveled below a “yellow fever line,” a geographic demarcation that included
the entire southern region—Washington, D.C., to St. Louis, Missouri, to El
29
Paso, Texas. Policy-holders who died of yellow fever forfeited any claim
unless they had previously paid an additional amount for a “southern
30
waiver” for yellow fever.
Anyone who previously survived yellow fever was believed to be immune,
as were African-Americans as a group, and those who had lived for some
31
time in yellow fever-prone areas were said to be “acclimated.” Nonetheless,
those who could do so left southern coastal areas every summer to avoid
yellow fever. They returned when cooler weather set in; experience taught
that outbreaks subsided soon after the first frost. As one November headline
alerted readers: “No More Quarantine; All the Cities Have Called it off This
32
Year.”

B. The Best Defense: Quarantine?
The transmission of yellow fever by mosquitoes would not be understood
33
until the turn of the twentieth century. The southern climate, combined
26
27
28
29
30

31
32
33

See Patterson, supra note 19 (speculating that various changes in technology contributed
to the decline).
Id. at 859.
Id.
See BLOOM, supra note 15, at 29.
See, e.g., Bennecke v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 105 U.S. 355 (1881). In that case, the
insured died of yellow fever in New Orleans during the 1878 epidemic. He had not
previously applied for a twenty dollar southern waiver of the life insurance geographic
limits. His brother-in-law attempted to do so when news of the epidemic came out, but
the insured was already dead by the time the twenty dollars was paid. The Court held that
the waiver was invalid and, to add insult to injury, the insurance claim was denied. See also
Globe Mut. Life Ins. v. Wolff, 95 U.S. 326 (1877) (voiding policy for violation of
geographic limit and explaining that allowing the claim would sanction “fraud” by the
policyholder).
Jo Ann Carrigan, Impact of Epidemic Yellow Fever on Life in Louisiana, 4 LA. HIST. 5, 6 (1963).
No More Quarantine, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 8, 1899, at 2 (reporting the widespread
termination of quarantines).
The United States Yellow Fever Commission published results establishing the mosquito
as vector in 1900. See MICHAEL B.A. OLDSTONE, VIRUSES, PLAGUES, AND HISTORY 65
(1998) (documenting the discovery of the mosquito as a vector at the start of the
twentieth century).
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with ubiquitous stagnant bodies of water, provided fertile areas for mosquito
reproduction. Mosquitoes could not survive year-round except in the
Florida Keys, so the annual introduction of yellow fever into the South came
34
by way of coastal shipping from Cuba and other points in the Caribbean.
Coastal areas proved unable to prevent the introduction of yellow fever
by strict maritime quarantine. As a result, the population’s best defense was
to flee from or avoid travel to coastal areas during the summer months.
Those who remained risked being prevented from escape—trapped by
inland towns that thought they could achieve with the shotgun what the
maritime quarantine could not.
Residents of towns beyond coastal areas believed spread of the disease
could only be stopped by prohibiting travelers and infected cargo from
entering their towns. The prevailing view in the South was that yellow fever
35
spread from person to person and by contact with infected objects. This
was partially right—mosquitoes, having a short flight range, required the
presence of a yellow fever sufferer in order to infect others. In addition,
cargo could harbor mosquitoes, and railroads could speed them throughout
36
the South. Hence, the appearance (or rumor) of a single case of yellow
fever anywhere set in motion defensive quarantine measures in townships
throughout the South.
In the nineteenth century, the standard legal definition for quarantine
stated:
[Q]uarantine is the existence of a line or cordon around an infected
territory, or part of such a territory, beyond which limits no person (and,
according to some rules, no goods) may pass until sufficient time may
have elapsed to permit proper officers to ascertain whether the persons
so desiring to pass from the infected district be, or be not, infected with
37
the disease.

A barrier or policy prohibiting travelers from entering or leaving an area was
38
also known as a cordon sanitaire. Then, as now, the governmental power to
34
35
36

37

38

See HUMPHREYS, supra note 15, at 124.
See NUWER, supra note 15, at 15–16.
R. Scott Huffard Jr., Infected Rails: Yellow Fever and Southern Railroads, 79 J. S. HIST. 79, 84
(2013) (explaining how railroads and train passengers contributed to the spread of
yellow fever).
Sherston Baker, Quarantine and Its Reform, 254 L. MAG. & REV. 72, 72–73 (Nov. 1884)
(defining quarantine as a practice in relation to the yellow fever epidemic). The modern
use of the term “quarantine” distinguishes “isolation”: “Isolation separates sick people
with a contagious disease from people who are not sick. Quarantine separates and
restricts the movement of people who were exposed to a contagious disease to see if they
become sick.” CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Quarantine and Isolation (last
updated Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine (describing the distinction
between the terms “isolation” and “quarantine”).
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Using a Tactic Unseen in a Century, Countries Cordon Off Ebola-Racked
Areas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2014, at A10.
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quarantine authorized the use of physical force against individuals and
39
groups.
The medical profession hotly disputed the cause of yellow fever, and
even whether it was contagious, until the discovery of the mosquito vector in
40
1902 became generally accepted.
Before that time, there were two
competing theories about how people acquired yellow fever. Medical
professionals could not agree on the best method to eliminate the threat of
yellow fever, and they also were starkly divided about the necessity of
41
preventing travel from infected areas. If yellow fever could be spread by
persons and contaminated objects, which was certainly the popularly-held
view, then strict quarantine of travelers and cargo seemed the best defense.
42
A rival theory argued that yellow fever was a result of poor sanitation.
Yellow fever seemed limited to cities and towns. As one historian noted,
“The miasma of cities, resulting from dead animals, the by-products of
slaughtering and rendering establishments, and piles of unremoved human
43
excrement, seemed distinctively capable of breeding yellow fever.” Under
such conditions, it was believed, yellow fever could arise spontaneously,
44
without introduction from another area. Better sanitation, burning, and
fumigation were the best defenses, while quarantine of travelers was
45
useless.
Holders of the sanitation theory were often distinctly unsympathetic to
the South. In the year following the devastating 1878 epidemic, one
northern journalist wrote about sanitation problems in Memphis:
With all the warning that was given by the fever then, nothing has since
been done in the way of drainage or purification. The fact is, Memphis is
one of the filthiest towns in all the South. . . . The worst feature of the

39

40

41
42
43
44
45

Modern quarantine authority in the United States permits the use of physical force by law
enforcement officers at the request of designated public health officials. The threat of
physical force through arrest is usually sufficient to encourage compliance with a
quarantine or isolation order, as experience with tuberculosis control measures has
shown. See Polly J. Price, Tuberculosis Control Laws in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region: Legal
Framework in the United States, 5–7 (Emory Univ. Sch. of L., Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series,
Paper No. 15-371, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2709829 (detailing American
quarantine and isolation policies and practices).
J. M. Lindsley, Quarantine Regulations Should Be Based Against Yellow Fever upon the Doctrine
that It Is Only Conveyed by the Mosquito, 29 PUB. HEALTH PAPERS & REP. 81 (1903),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2222399/.
BLOOM, supra note 15, at 11–22.
Id.; see also HUMPHREYS, supra note 15, at 7.
HUMPHREYS, supra note 15, at 19 (describing the unhygienic living conditions in urban
areas, which was believed to have exacerbated the spread of yellow fever).
BLOOM, supra note 15, at 13.
Id. at 38, 112–13; HUMPHREYS, supra note 15, at 53, 151.
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sorrow is that the native inhabitants have no ambition to remove the
46
cause . . . .

Fumigation became a common practice for ships and railroad cars; a few
towns undertook what was termed a “general fumigation” by burning
47
disinfectants in the streets. Disconcertingly, one health officer reported:
“The first two days succeeding a general fumigation, the fumigating crews
invariably had trouble with the people who had ‘fumigated themselves’ a day
48
or two before.”

C. The Mechanics of the Shotgun Quarantine
The first use of “shotgun quarantine” in the popular press occurred after
the devastating 1878 outbreak. A writer for The Chicago Daily Tribune
employed the phrase in an article about his recent travels in the South:
We asked a dweller in one of these villages if the yellow fever would come
again with Midsummer. “No, sir,” he answered: “not if shotguns can
keep it out of this town.”
It is most natural for Southern whites to resort to the shotgun in all their
troubles. They have adopted the theory that yellow fever is spread solely
by contact. . . . They therefore propose to prevent all intercourse between
neighborhoods,—to station patrols, armed with shotguns, on all their
highways, and to entirely prevent all traveling.
....
It may be that the strictest SHOTGUN QUARANTINE will prove
ineffectual against its advance. It is doubtful, however, if the Southern
49
white will ever comprehend this contingency.

Whether this writer coined the phrase or heard it elsewhere, soon thereafter
other newspapers discussed the “shotgun quarantine,” and it quickly became
the customary terminology used to label any locality’s declaration of a
quarantine against entry from points infected, or rumored to be infected,
50
with yellow fever.

46

47
48

49
50

Margaret Warner, Local Control Versus National Interest: The Debate over Southern Public
Health, 1878–1884, 50 J.S. HIST. 407, 421 (1984) (quoting Boston’s Commonwealth, July 26,
1879).
Yellow Fever Spreads in Small Parishes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1905, at 3.
U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BUREAU OF PUB. HEALTH AND MARINE-HOSP. SERV., Doc. NO. 2456,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SURGEON-GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND MARINEHOSPITAL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1906, at 155 (1907)
(describing an adverse effect of fumigation).
Way Down South, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 8, 1879, at 9 (depicting what likely was the first use
of the term “shotgun quarantine”).
For example, a search of ProQuest Historical Databases (thirteen leading newspapers)
between 1878 and 1910 returns more than 250 articles using the term “shotgun
quarantine.”
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Headline, The Hennessee (Okla.) Clipper, September 7, 1905

The earliest use of the term “shotgun quarantine” in the Washington Post
appeared in 1879 in a headline from Memphis, described as follows:
The quarantine fever has, however, struck Arkansas with more force than
ever. The Sheriff of Crittenden, just across the river, has ordered the
arrest and imprisonment of all Memphians caught in the act of crossing.
51
The whole riverfront is closely watched by armed police.
52

A sampling of headlines from the New York Times, The Chicago Daily
53
54
Tribune, The Washington Post, and other newspapers highlight the shotgun
quarantine and the problems it caused:
55

“Shotguns Keep All Trains on the Move”
“The Shotgun in Alabama: A Quarantine That Evidently Means
56
Business”
“Fight on Quarantine: Louisiana May Use Troops to Lift Local
57
Embargoes . . . Many Towns Without Medicines and Short of Food”
51

52
53
54

55
56
57

Yellow Fever: Still Spreading in Memphis—The Shotgun Quarantine, WASH. POST, Aug. 23,
1879, at 1 (employing the first known use of the term “shotgun quarantine” in one of the
nation’s premier publications).
See generally A Shotgun Quarantine, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1886, at 1; Shotgun Quarantine on
Mississippi Border to Bar Out Animals Exposed to Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1924, at 13.
“Shotgun” Quarantine—Panic in the Yellow-Fever Districts Worse Than the Disease, CHI. DAILY
TRIB., Aug. 16, 1888, at 5; A Shotgun Quarantine, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 1888, at 2.
Shotgun Quarantine, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1898, at 4; Shotgun Quarantine Denounced, WASH.
POST, Nov. 7, 1897, at 1; Under Shotgun Quarantine, WASH. POST, May 21, 1899, at 3; A
Shotgun Quarantine Against Biloxi, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1886, at 1.
Shotguns Keep All Trains on the Move, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 13, 1897, at 2.
The Shotgun in Alabama: A Quarantine That Evidently Means Business, ATLANTA CONST., Sept.
27, 1888, at 2.
Fight on Quarantine, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1905, at 1.
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58

“All Have Shotgun Quarantine”

What constituted a “shotgun quarantine?” The salient features derive
from contemporary reports. The shotgun quarantine was characterized by
two key concepts:
• A geographic boundary: The declaration of a “cordon sanitaire” that
prohibited a population from entering or leaving an area. The
geographic barrier applied to all persons, whether sick or well, and if not
sick, without regard to whether they were likely to become so. Trains
attempting to pass through the cordon would either be stopped before
59
entering, or not permitted to discharge passengers or cargo.
• Armed, deputized deterrence: Enforcement of the cordon by local or state
government authority, to prevent or deter entry by anything or anybody.
Rarely were shotgun quarantines the work of vigilantes. Although the
term suggests mob rule, shotgun quarantines came at the behest of
mayors, town councils, and other political bodies. Formal declarations
gave official imprimatur to enlist citizens or militias to aid sheriffs in
60
guarding the line or in preventing trains from stopping there.
Shotgun quarantines were usually declared “against” other towns or
areas where yellow fever was believed to be present. For example, the
Washington Post reported:
The quarantine against portions of Harrison County, Miss., has been
removed. The citizens of Pass Christian have established a strict shotgun
quarantine against Biloxi, armed guards being placed at all avenues of
61
ingress from that town and vigilance will be maintained day and night.

In another example, the Indianapolis Journal reported in 1888: “Special
telegrams from Grenada, Corinth and other Mississippi towns report
shotgun quarantine having been established against Decatur, Ala., Jackson,
62
Miss., and other infected points.”
Shotgun quarantines could be put in place quickly, relying on deputized
volunteers where militias or law enforcement officers were lacking. In one
episode, as the Washington Post described,
It is probable that there was never a more rigid quarantine established
than that with which Meridian, Miss., sought to protect herself from the
invasion of the yellow fever. As soon as the fever appeared in Mississippi,
quarantine was declared against the infected place, and when the fever
58
59
60
61

62

All Have Shotgun Quarantine, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 23, 1888, at 13.
See sources cited infra notes 61–64.
See, e.g., A Big Scare in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1897, at 1 (noting, in the sub-heading,
“Talk of Reorganizing the Shotgun Quarantine Force”).
A Shotgun Quarantine Against Biloxi, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1886, at 1 (chronicling an
instance when one county declared a shotgun quarantine against all residents of another
town).
Fever Panic in the South, INDIANAPOLIS J., Sept. 22, 1888, at 2 (chronicling an instance when
a municipality declared a shotgun quarantine against several cities).
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began to spread the city shut herself up tight, placing a military guard in
the outskirts and forbidding any person to come across the line. The
63
railroads also were forbidden to discharge passengers there . . . .”

The most frequent press reports of shotgun quarantines occurred during
the three big epidemics of 1878, 1897, and 1905. Even when armed men
were not present, the term “shotgun quarantine” (and, occasionally,
64
“shotgun brigade” ) became shorthand for preventing trains from stopping
or discharging passengers, and for refusing entry to persons traveling from
65
other areas.
In addition, local authorities might quarantine persons inside a cordon
to prevent their escape. In one incident, a sheriff in Columbia, South
Carolina, arrested a judge who stepped outside “a ring of special policemen”
surrounding the hotel where he was staying, where authorities suspected a
66
resident had contracted smallpox. The town marshal was fined five dollars
67
“for letting a prisoner escape.”
As related in more detail below, railroads—and their passengers and
cargo—bore the brunt of shotgun quarantines throughout the region.

II.

GOVERNING DISEASE BY MARTIAL LAW

Pestilence, like war, disrupts society, and silences the law.

68

Although the shotgun quarantine was a distinctly regional phenomenon,
its origin was embedded in the local government law of each state. Efforts to
rein in the chaotic shotgun quarantine required greater centralization of
state authority. But quarantine was a significant way in which local
governments unilaterally could impede interstate commerce, and states
found themselves unable to rein them in.

63

64

65

66
67
68

A Southern View of the Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1898, at 6 (chronicling an instance when
a city prohibited railroads from discharging passengers within its borders); see also
Columbus Bars Montgomery: There is a Shotgun Quarantine Maintained at Some Points, ATLANTA
CONST., Oct. 19, 1897, at 2.
James H. McCall, The Quarantine Laws and National Control of Quarantine, 72 MED. NEWS
483, 484 (1898) (“One county in Western Tennessee went so far as to station a shotgun
brigade on the county line for the purpose of preventing any trains from passing through
the county.”).
Litigation for commercial loss following yellow fever epidemics is an interesting story in
itself, the subject of a subsequent article.
For example, railroads were sued,
unsuccessfully, by banana shippers whose cargo spoiled en route due to local quarantines.
See, e.g., Ala. & V.R. Co. v. Tirelli Bros., 93 Miss. 797, 962–63 (1909) (holding that a
railroad carrier was excused for refusing to complete a shipment of bananas due to a
force it was unable to control: a local quarantine of bananas).
Sheriff Arrests a Judge, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 21, 1901, at 3.
Id.
Sims v. State, 72 Tenn. 357, 360 (1880).
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A. State and Local Quarantine Authority
The right of a state or local government to impose a quarantine existed
69
from the time of independence, based upon pre-existing colonial norms.
In most states this authority was made explicit by legislation granting the
power to declare quarantines to the governor as well as to counties and
70
municipalities.
Under these statutes, local shotgun quarantines were
legitimate exercises of political power. Local governments scrupulously
noted the legality of their actions, bristling at the equation of the shotgun
71
quarantine with mob rule. In reality, it was likely difficult to distinguish
measured decision-making from the political persuasion of the mob to
compel town governments to act.
Georgia provides a good example. From statehood, the Georgia
Assembly recognized that control of contagious disease was a responsibility
72
of local government. The 1793 Quarantine Act, at more than 2000 words,
was one of the most significant and detailed early legislative acts, and its
purpose was to prevent the introduction of “plague, smallpox, malignant
73
fever, or any other contagious distemper.” Subsequent amendments to the
1793 Act show attempts to clarify which authorities were in charge of
quarantine matters, and the extent of their power.
In the 1793 Act, much of which concerned maritime quarantine, local
justices of the peace and customs officers were authorized to impose fines
on maritime vessels alleged to have violated the terms of the Act, with courts
69

70

71
72

73

See William Hamilton Cowles, State Quarantine Laws and the Federal Constitution, 25 AM. L.
REV. 45, 67–69 (1891) (explaining debates in the first Congress and the original terms of
federal presence at seaports).
See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Biodefense and Constitutional Constraints, 4 U. Miami Nat'l Sec.
& Armed Conflict L. Rev. 82, 99 (2014) (discussing an early Massachusetts quarantine
law). See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824) (citing “quarantine laws” as an
example of “that immense mass of legislation . . . which can be most advantageously
exercised by the States themselves”); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 400 (1849) (citing
quarantine laws as an example of the states’ legitimate exercise of the power of “selfpreservation,” or the power to “guard against the introduction of any thing which may . . .
endanger the health or lives of their citizens”).
See Have Lost Their Heads: Parts of the South Under Mob Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1888, at 1
(characterizing certain local legislative acts as mob rule).
See, e.g., Act of Dec. 17, 1793, No. 485, para. IX, reprinted in A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE
STATE OF GEORGIA 514, 517 (Robert Watkins & George Watkins eds., Philadelphia, R.
Aitken 1800) [hereinafter 1793 QUARANTINE ACT] (authorizing “justices of the county or
commissioners of the town” next to inlets and rivers to appoint “centinels” and “guardboats” to enforce quarantine). This division of state and local government is consistent
with the findings of William Novak, who has provided other examples of local authority
deriving from limited state capacity. See William J. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal
Origins of State Power in America, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1061, 1078–79 (1994) (describing the
New York State legislation that granted to the city of Albany “ample powers to pass
regulations of their own”).
1793 QUARANTINE ACT, supra note 72, at 516.
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74

enforcing the fines. Practical limitations on the availability and number of
justices of the peace led the Legislature to provide for whistleblowers—any
person could collect part of the fine imposed on a ship captain or owner
75
who had failed to report sickness or maintain a quarantine. Failure to
report sickness of crew or passengers, or failure to answer truthfully, meant a
76
fine of £100.
For persons entering the state by land or traveling inland from a port,
the governor of the state had the power by proclamation to appoint
“centinels” who in turn had authority to turn away or compel the return of
anyone suspected of carrying a contagious disease. Should a sentinel fail in
this duty, he was subject to the same fine levied on a person who disobeyed
77
or fled a quarantine order.
While the governor possessed executive authority to proclaim a
quarantine anywhere in the state, towns and counties had the same authority
78
within their jurisdictions and were expected to use it. The city of Savannah
had its own quarantine power, described in separate provisions of the 1793
Act, reflecting its preeminence in population and the commerce of its port
79
as well as the frequency of its own yellow fever episodes.
Decisions
respecting quarantine were invested in the “Corporation of Savannah,” and
80
mention is made of a “health officer” for the port. Like county justices and
town commissioners, the Corporation of Savannah could “use all and every
81
means in their power to enforce this law for the purposes intended.”
Justices of the peace could impose fines or seek jail time by petitioning a
82
local court.
Over the next century, various amendments and permutations of the
Quarantine Act characterize legislative attention to quarantine. These
changes share two characteristics: (1) local elected officials had unilateral
power to determine the need for a quarantine, its duration, and whether the
74
75
76
77
78

79

80
81
82

Id. at 515.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 516.
1793 QUARANTINE ACT, supra note 72, at 517. Justices of the county or commissioners of
any town were “fully authorized to fix such centinels [sic], guard-boats and to use all and
every means in their power to enforce this law for the purposes intended.” Id.
Id. at 516–17. “Negroes” were automatically quarantined for ten days on land following
the arrival of the ship. Id. This provision was noted to be “obsolete” in a compilation
published in 1822, as slave importation had been outlawed after 1808. A DIGEST OF THE
LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 191 (Oliver H. Prince ed., Milledgeville, Grantland &
Orme 1822), http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/ga_code/6. Free persons of color
arriving in the city were subject to other administrative burdens, but those were not
especially disease-control measures.
1793 QUARANTINE ACT, supra note 72, at 516–17.
Id.
Id. at 515.
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local quarantine order had been violated; and (2) judicial involvement was
limited to enforcing penalties—either a fine or jail time, at the discretion of
the elected official.
This basic structure remained the same as
improvements in interstate travel (especially by rail) increased the likelihood
of contagious disease introduced from other states.
As the number of counties and townships grew, so did the number of
independent political subdivisions with independent quarantine power.
83
Today, each Georgia county retains quarantine authority, meaning a
“legal” quarantine, with or without shotguns, is possible in any one of
Georgia’s 159 counties.
The Supreme Court recognized a seemingly unlimited local police
84
power for quarantine as early as Gibbons v. Ogden and again in 1900, noting
that “from an early day the power of the States to enact and enforce
quarantine laws for the safety and the protection of the health of their
85
inhabitants . . . is beyond question.”
As we shall see, in light of the massive disruption to travel and commerce
occasioned by the shotgun quarantine, it is striking that the Dormant
Commerce Clause did not play any role in legal debate at the time. The
86
shotgun quarantine would seem an easy target for federal preemption.
The same is true for the later development of a “right to travel” protected by
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, a concept closely related to the
87
Dormant Commerce Clause.
Neither of these constitutional doctrines
made any appearance in the debates over state and local quarantine.
Why are these constitutional ideas absent from debate? One answer may
be the transient nature of the quarantines and the inability of any court to
83

84

85
86

87

GA. CODE ANN. § 31-12-4 (2016) (“The department [of health] may . . . require
quarantine or surveillance of carriers of disease and persons exposed to, or suspected of
being infected with, infectious disease until they are found to be free of the infectious
agent or disease in question.”).
22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824) (describing how inspection laws “form a portion of that immense
mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a State not
surrendered to the General Government; all which can be most advantageously exercised
by the States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every
description . . . are component parts of this mass”).
Compagnie Francaise De Navigation A Vapeur v. La. Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387
(1902).
For a general background on the historical development of the “Dormant Commerce
Clause” doctrine, see Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause
and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569 (1987); Donald H. Regan,
The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84
MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
For historical background on the “right to travel” as a constitutional interest, see Bryan H.
Wildenthal, State Parochialism, the Right to Travel, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (1989); see also Kathryn E. Wilhelm, Freedom of Movement at
a Standstill? Toward the Establishment of a Fundamental Right to Intrastate Travel, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 2461 (2010).
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intervene in a timely fashion. But the dominant reason is that immediate
health risks were categorically different from commerce and other
constitutional relations between states. By the early 1900s the Supreme
Court had recognized as much in the Quarantine Cases, concerning a state’s
88
right to prevent entry of cattle from another state.
In the same period, the Supreme Court also recognized a sweeping local
government power (indeed, a responsibility) in times of health emergencies.
89
Jacobson v. Massachusetts upheld the prosecution of a person who refused to
be vaccinated during a smallpox outbreak. In doing so, the Court stated
that “[u]pon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a
community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease
90
which threatens the safety of its members.”
This privilege for local
protectionism trumped the myriad difficulties posed by the shotgun
quarantine, as described below. What separates us today from the
constitutional status of the shotgun quarantine is the due process revolution
of the twentieth century, not the Commerce Clause.

B. The Refugee Problem
A gentleman from this city tried to get to Faunsdale, south Alabama, to
see his wife, who was visiting there. He was escorted out of three towns
by armed guards, after being compelled to leave a quarantine train thirty
miles from his destination. . . . He was finally compelled to walk twenty
miles under guard to the station, where he could get a train back to this
91
city.

At the first appearance of yellow fever, untold numbers attempted to flee
the region, especially from the South’s commercial cities. In 1878 in
Memphis, for example, more than half of the city’s population of 47,000 left
92
to escape the disease, most to more northerly regions. In some years the
flood of refugees was so great that relief camps were established for those
93
denied passage.

88
89
90
91
92
93

Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902) (validating state statute protecting cattle from risk
of disease by cattle from another state).
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
Id. at 27.
The Shotgun in Alabama, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 27, 1888, at 2.
See Benjamin Evans, The Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1878 and Public Health Reform in Memphis,
15 RHODES HIST. REV. 1, 11 (2013).
See, e.g., United States Marine-Hospital Service, Annual Report of the Supervising Surgeon-General of the Marine-Hospital Service of the United States for the Fiscal Year 1898
(1899) (discussing detention camps for the prevention of yellow fever). As a relief
measure, the federal government established detention camps at several points to receive
travelers turned-away by quarantines. Those detained were provided with a certificate
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News headlines, once again, illustrated the refugee problem:
“Cities Along the Way Closed, Passengers Not Allowed to Alight
94
Anywhere Short of Alabama Line”
95
“Railroads Stop All Their Trains”
96
“Terrified South Ties Up Traffic”
97
“Atlanta and the Refugees”
“No Quarter in the South: Frightened People Are Refused a Refuge:
Some Communities Are Terror-Stricken by the Report that Fever is
98
within a Hundred Miles”

Some cities north of the coast, including Atlanta and Nashville, invited
refugees to come, provided they could get through shotgun quarantines
99
along the way. Travelers at times could board special “refugee trains” to
100
these sanctuaries.
The American Medical Association condemned the shotgun quarantine
101
because of “its brutality of administration in so many places.”
With all its rigors and entailed human suffering, the shotgun quarantine
always fails of its object to arrest every incomer. There is ever a
loophole—a careless or avaricious or potatious guard, or a byway that
escapes watch. The traveler of the better class, going openly, can not
miss detention or deportation, but the criminal and the tramp, and at
times the local celebrity of powerful connections, can always find an open
door. Town after town in the infected area is demonstrating these
102
truths.

To the extent travelers received some kind of individual inspection, they
had two possible ways to pass through a shotgun quarantine. One was to
prove, somehow, that they had not traveled from or been present in any area
103
where yellow fever was thought to exist.
Another was to demonstrate

94
95
96
97
98
99

100
101
102
103

upon discharge, to prove length of time away from a yellow-fever zone. For further
discussion of federal action, see Part IV infra.
P.J. Moran, Greenville and the Yellow Fever, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 16, 1897, at 3.
Railroads Stop All Their Trains, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 19, 1897, at 6.
Terrified South Ties Up Traffic, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 29, 1905, at 3.
Atlanta and the Refugees, ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 19, 1888, at 12.
No Quarter in the South, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1888, at 1.
See Nashville Invites Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1905, at 2; see also Atlanta and the Refugees,
ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 19, 1888, at 12 (“Atlanta is the only city in the gulf and south
Atlantic states that has not refused to shelter the yellow fever refugees from Florida.”).
See Decatur, Alabama, Lifts Quarantine, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 3, 1897, at 9 (describing
refugee trains); Georgia Towns Ask Protection, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 22, 1899, at 24.
Yellow Fever, 45 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 722, 722–23 (Sept. 2, 1905).
Id.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Ala. G.S.R. Co., 28 So. 567 (Miss. 1900) (noting one state’s regulation,
which prohibited certain people from infected areas from exiting trains at state’s train
stations, and providing exceptions for certain people from non-infected areas merely
passing through the state); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Roane, 46 So. 711, 711–12 (Miss.
1908) (noting that, in the midst of the yellow fever epidemic in Mississippi and Louisiana,
most Southern states required passengers to show health certificates).
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104

Some
immunity from yellow fever by having had the disease in the past.
105
residents obtained or forged a physician’s note to this effect.
Later in the nineteenth century, state boards of health sought to
standardize the process by issuing “official” immunity cards in an effort to
aid the state’s citizens. An example follows:

Florida State Board of Health “Yellow Fever Immunity Card,” 1899.

104

105

But see Wendy E. Parmet, From Slaughter-House to Lochner: The Rise and Fall of the
Constitutionalization of Public Health, 40 Am. J. Legal Hist. 476, 493 n.131 (1996) (noting
that Louisiana’s ordinance went a step further, permitting its Board of Health to block
the entry of individuals whether “unacclimated” or “acclimated” to yellow fever).
See infra note 106 and accompanying text. African Americans, though as a general rule
subject to discrimination in travel and accommodation, seem to have been treated more
equally to their white counterparts who were subject to a shotgun quarantine. African
Americans were perceived to have immunity from yellow fever, based on their African
ancestry, and were sometimes even allowed to travel on special “excursion trains” through
yellow fever zones. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BUREAU OF PUB. HEALTH AND MARINE-HOSP.
SERV., supra note 48, at 148–49 (noting that a majority of excursionists from Vicksburg
during an outbreak of yellow fever were of African descent and that “[i]t is a well-known
fact” yellow fever was milder among people of African descent).

Dec. 2016]

EPIDEMICS, OUTSIDERS, AND LOCAL PROTECTION

389

Florida State Board of Health “Yellow Fever Immunity Card,” 1899.

The “Yellow Fever Immunity Card” pictured above ostensibly permitted
travel on railroads and other conveyances or on foot through quarantined
areas. Note that proof of immunity was based on the individual’s having
“experienced an attack of yellow fever,” followed by the location and year.
Receipt of the card depended upon the credibility of the individual and the
cooperation of a physician. Scams abounded, including “contemptible petty
robbery of the ignorant” by way of certificate and notarial fees; dozens of
106
card holders were turned back because of fraudulent papers.
Possession of a health certificate did not guarantee the cooperation of
local health inspectors, however. In one particularly sad case, two brothers
returning home from tuberculosis treatment in the West purchased tickets
from Memphis to Oxford, Mississippi, but were required to change trains at
107
Holly Springs, Mississippi.
The brothers boarded the train at Memphis,
but during the trip they were approached by a man who claimed to be a
quarantine officer of the city of Holly Springs and were told to get off the
train. Even though the boys possessed certificates showing that they had not
been in any yellow fever-infected region, they were forced to leave the train
at a rural station, leaving the boys to make their way back to Memphis on
foot. Two days later, they traveled by another route to Oxford. One brother

106
107

U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BUREAU OF PUB. HEALTH AND MARINE-HOSP. SERV., supra note 48, at
182.
St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Roane, 46 So. 711, 711–12 (Miss. 1908).
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died from tuberculosis two days after arriving at Oxford. His brother lived
108
only a few weeks more, both deaths allegedly hastened by the ordeal.
Railroads did not assume responsibility for passengers reaching the
109
destination for which they had purchased a ticket. Moreover, in this time
110
period, passengers had only a nascent constitutional “right to travel,” and
certainly no judicially enforceable right to pass through a quarantine
imposed under the authority of the state’s police power. Any “right to
travel” was not likely enforceable in any meaningful way, as described below.
Travelers had no effective remedy through the judicial system. Courts
were unable to intervene—sometimes years passed before tort or contract
suits wound their way through trial and appeal. Even if they could petition a
court for an injunction or writ of mandamus, judges deferred to medical
opinion on the necessity of quarantine and were unwilling to referee
111
disputes about it.
Tort and contract remedies, moreover, were limited. Judges preferred
not to revisit governmental choices during an epidemic. One of the few
successful claims grew out of the 1897 epidemic. In Wilson v. Alabama G. S.
112
R. Co., the railroad was held liable for damages in forcing a passenger to
disembark at the Mississippi state line on account of a quarantine by the
Mississippi State Board of Health. But in that case, no Mississippi health
officers were actually present to compel obedience to the quarantine. The
108
109

110

111

112

Id.
See The Railroads in Epidemics, ATLANTA CONST., April 1, 1898, at 11; R. Scott Huffard, Jr.,
Infected Rails: Yellow Fever and Southern Railroads, 79 J.S. HIST. 79, 80 (2013) (describing the
adjustment of residents to the development of railroads in the South as “anything but
smooth”).
In 1867, the Supreme Court ruled that the right of travel throughout the United States
was a right, privilege, or immunity of national citizenship. This right could not be
interfered with by a state seeking to impose a capitation tax upon all travelers. Crandall v.
Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 49 (1867). For subsequent developments regarding the constitutional
right to enter and reside in any U.S. state, see Kevin Maher, Like A Phoenix from the Ashes:
Saenz v. Roe, the Right to Travel, and the Resurrection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 105, 106–07 (2001) (discussing how the right
to travel was, ostensibly, protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as recognized in the Slaughterhouse Cases); see also Jason Alloy,
Note, “158-County Banishment” in Georgia: Constitutional Implications under the State
Constitution and the Federal Right to Travel, 36 GA. L. REV. 1083 (2002) (discussing Georgia’s
practice of banishment as a punishment for crimes). Interestingly, no federal
constitutional arguments appear to have been made in the case of a Maine nurse who
sued the state’s health department over the terms of her quarantine order. See Order
Pending Hearing, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. 2014-36 (D. Me., Oct. 31, 2014) (noting that no
mention of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
made in the Plaintiff’s argument in her suit against the state’s quarantine).
Tort and contract decisions as well as extra-legal norms occasioned by the various yellow
fever epidemics in the South are beyond the immediate scope of this Article. A full
treatment of this subject will be the subject of a separate article.
Wilson v. Ala. G.S.R. Co., 28 So. 567 (Miss. 1900).
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railroad company acted, it said, because it had been given prior notice of the
order. Absent compulsion by health authorities, the railroad was held liable
for wrongful discharge and the resulting damage suffered by the
113
passenger.
As the Mississippi Supreme Court explained:
The public health must be vigilantly cared for, but with due caution that
no order intended to secure it shall be so sweeping and arbitrary as to
interfere unreasonably with the citizen’s rights of return to his home,
neither he nor it having been exposed to infection. With every
disposition to uphold all reasonable regulations of our efficient and
faithful board of health, we are constrained by the oft-settled doctrines
applicable to declare this order void for unreasonableness. Doubtless
this order would not have been given its unconfined sweep, but for the
114
hurry and excitement of the times.

But obedience to a quarantine order when enforcement was not
imminent was a risk the railroad assumed:
The railroad company must take the risk—as all citizens do—as to the
validity of such orders, when it yields to the order alone. And when its
defense is, not that it yielded obedience because only of the order, but
because, also, of vis major,—a shotgun quarantine, for example,—its
defense will be maintained, if it shall appear that such vis major, such
uncontrollable necessity, was the real cause of its action. It need not go
to the extent of actual collision with force marshaled by necessity; but it
must show that its action was due to such force, existing and capable of
115
controlling its action.

The railroad had acted solely on the authority of an order later deemed
“void” and thus was liable to its passenger. But the prevailing judicial
attitude did not question a local government’s right to impose any
quarantine it saw fit, frequently citing the maxim, salus populi suprema lex—
116
“the health of the people should be the supreme law.”
If passengers were not generally considered to be engaged in interstate
commerce, cargo and mail shipments clearly were. The significant effect of
the shotgun quarantine on business interests is surveyed below.

C. Commercial Disruption, Rivalry, and Rumor
The disruption to commerce resulting from the shotgun quarantine,
more than the plight of refugees, provoked business leaders and the
politicians they lobbied to pursue legislative solutions.

113
114
115
116

Id. at 569.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 567–69.
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Beyond doubt, the North was aware of the commercial impact
occasioned by the shotgun quarantine in the South, as is evident from news
articles in the Washington Post, the Chicago Daily Tribune, and the New York
Times. As some headlines alerted readers:
More Fever Cases: Situation Not Regarded as Unusually Alarming. Heavy
117
Blow to Business: Texas and Mississippi Quarantines Especially Severe.
118
Yellow Fever Epidemic . . . . Business Much Depressed
119
All Trade Stagnant

The Wall Street Journal reported local quarantines as they were imposed
in the South, further evidence of the attention to commercial disruption
120
caused by the shotgun quarantine.
Unsurprisingly, local business interests outside the afflicted areas backed
efforts to prevent shotgun quarantines. At various points, chambers of
commerce, hoteliers, railroad officials, and the League of American
121
Municipalities lobbied state legislatures and Congress for relief. “Railroad
men” were especially concerned, with representatives of the various rail lines
122
joining state and regional conferences on quarantine.
These same groups also had an incentive to suppress reports of yellow
fever in their cities, for fear of interference with commerce that would result
from shotgun quarantines imposed against them. Accordingly, health
officials accused each other of bowing to political pressure by failing to
123
report legitimate cases of yellow fever.
One of the most prominent
124
disputes arose in the vicinity of Biloxi, Mississippi.
Health officials from
New Orleans and Mobile insisted Biloxi physicians were covering up cases of
yellow fever, while Biloxi health officials, in turn, accused them of inciting
an quarantine without adequate justification:
The people of Biloxi held a mass meeting to-day [sic] and passed
resolutions expressing their confidence in the medical intelligence and
117
118
119
120
121

122

123

124

More Fever Cases, WASH. POST, July 30, 1905, at 1.
Yellow Fever Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1897, at 5.
All Trade Stagnant, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1897, at 2.
See, e.g., Yellow Fever Conditions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1897, at 2; Effect of Yellow Fever, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 2, 1898, at 4; The Yellow Fever Situation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1905, at 2.
See, e.g., Unify Quarantine Throughout Land: Atlanta Chamber of Commerce Secures Unanimous
Action, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 17, 1897, at 1; see also State Quarantine Ineffectual, WASH.
POST, Dec. 14, 1900, at 1 (recounting the urging of Dr. Brunner of the League of
American Municipalities for national quarantine laws).
For a Uniform Quarantine Law, ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 30, 1898, at 17; Yellow Jack Convention
Meets and Adopts Code for the South, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 17, 1898, at 5; see also Many
Officials Will Be Present, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 23, 1905, at 3.
Quarantine in the Gulf States, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1884, at 5 (“The meeting had hardly got
to work before Dr. Jerome Cochrane, of Mobile, accused the helath officers of Louisiana
and Florida of withholding information about yellow fever cases from the Alabama
authorities.”).
A Shotgun Quarantine, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1886, at 1.
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experience of their local physicians, who had declared the cases of
sickness to be bilous [sic] remittent fever, denouncing the report of the
visiting officials of New-Orleans [sic] and Mobile, which has done the
town an irreparable injury in driving away hundreds of visitors, stopping
125
trade, and depriving hundreds of working people of their daily bread.

By the same turn, city officials often accused business interests in other
126
locations of spreading false rumors for commercial gain.
The degree of
panic, however, probably led to rumors regardless of motive. As one
headline described, for example, “Rome Will Not Quarantine: Rumor that a
127
Case Was Found Caused a Panic Almost.” The Atlanta Constitution blamed
journalists for much of the “insane yellow fever panic,” describing how
correspondents “in every little hamlet” sent news reports “from every little
128
cross-roads town in the south.”
The most public accusation of a politically-motivated economic embargo
129
involved the states of Louisiana and Texas.
Texas sealed its borders with
Louisiana following reports of yellow fever in New Orleans. In a lawsuit
brought before the U.S. Supreme Court, Louisiana officials claimed the
strict quarantine was unnecessary and was designed to benefit the port of
Galveston and other cities in Texas at the expense of the commerce of New
130
Orleans.
The Court declined to hear the case on the ground that it did
131
not have original jurisdiction.
Another quarrel between the governors of Mississippi and Louisiana over
quarantine jurisdiction seems certain to have been about underlying
commercial interests. According to a writer for the Chicago Daily Tribune:
Gov. Vardaman of Mississippi equipped a flotilla and, as Gov. Blanchard
of Louisiana afterward complained, invaded the waters of the latter state,
driving out the fishermen, seizing vast oyster fields, etc., occupying

125
126

127
128
129
130
131

Id.
See A Shotgun Quarantine, N.Y. TIMES., Sept. 3, 1886, at 1 (“The people of Biloxi held a
mass meeting to-day . . . denouncing the report of the visiting officials of New-Orleans
and Mobile, which has done the town an irreparable injury in driving away hundreds of
visitors, stopping trade, [etc.] . . . .”); No Yellow Fever at Biloxi, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1886, at
5 (“The Biloxi yellow fever sensation has fizzled out. . . . [B]ut Cadet point, where the
cases of sickness occurred, is quarantined . . . not because the recent diseases were
infectious, but for the comfort and solace of other cities.”). The most serious and public
accusations arose between Louisiana and Texas during the epidemic of 1905. See Part
IV.A infra.
Rome Will Not Quarantine: Rumor That a Case Was Found Caused a Panic Almost, ATLANTA
CONST., Sept. 21, 1897, at 1.
A Senseless Scare Abating, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 27, 1888, at 4.
See Louisiana Against Texas Treatment, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 16, 1899, at 1.
Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 8 (1900). This case is examined in Part IV.A infra.
Id. at 23.
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Louisiana territory, and generally committing unwarranted and
132
intolerable depredations.

An opinion in the Atlanta Constitution favored a national quarantine law
precisely to counter such economic embargoes:
The one remedy for such manifestations is a national quarantine law
broad enough in its provisions to meet every emergency. . . . We should
hear no more of shotgun quarantines, and there would be no basis for
irritation or ill feeling between states, or between communities in
133
different states.

Business losses in each major epidemic were difficult to estimate. During
a given fever season, a time-lapse geographic map of locally-imposed
shotgun quarantines would show hundreds of towns lighting up as sickness
134
spread.
The effect would be like a disco strobe light. Under such
circumstances it was difficult for people to plan even ordinary commercial
transactions, with the result that many businesses, large and small, closed
135
their doors permanently.
The yellow fever epidemics of the latter part of the nineteenth century
created pressure to restructure the balance between state and local police
power. The shotgun quarantine proved that state governments had limited
legal authority over independently-minded local communities. As a result,
state legislatures undertook to centralize control over quarantine authority.
These measures would fail to achieve their purpose, leading to the
conclusion that only the federal government could provide an effective
solution.

D. Regional Solutions?
Similar disputes took place throughout the South, as governors and
legislatures attempted to quell the local shotgun quarantine. The failure of
these efforts led southern health officials to attempt region-wide responses
to yellow fever epidemics. Ultimately, the attempt to attain uniform regional
standards would fail, leading southern politicians to ask for federal
intervention.

132
133
134

135

Richard Weightman, Edible Enlightenment in South’s Quarantine War, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct.
14, 1905, at 8.
Wanted: A National Quarantine Law, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 17, 1899, at 6.
For example, The Atlanta Constitution reported, “Brunswick’s city council held a called
meeting tonight and passed a resolution authorizing Mayor Atkinson to quarantine
against any places he believed to have yellow fever and at any time he deemed proper.”
Brunswick Ready for Quarantine, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 12, 1899, at 1.
Appalling Affliction, DAILY AM., Sept. 6, 1878 at 1 (describing the “gloomy” effect of having
“all the business houses except two drug stores” closed in Brownsville, Tennessee); In a
Panic!, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 16, 1897, at 1 (“The state capital [of Mississippi]
depopulated, its business houses closed, its newspapers suspended . . . .”).
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Following the far-reaching epidemics of 1897 and 1905, delegates from
southern states attended regional conferences aimed at a coordinated
response to yellow fever.

1. Mobile Convention, 1898
At the request of Governor Johnston of Alabama, representatives of
southern states met in Mobile to plan a quarantine convention of the South
Atlantic and Gulf states. Representation was to be “fixed at five members,
appointed by the governor of each state, one delegate from each
municipality and one from each commercial organization, railroad system
and river transportation company, [and] all chiefs of quarantine service in
136
the states . . . .”
The program, the invitation stated, would cover “the
whole subject of quarantine in relation to state and national government . . .
137
.” In anticipation of the convention, the organizing committee adopted a
resolution “appealing to [C]ongress to withhold action on the public health
and quarantine matters until the subject can receive the attention its
138
importance demands.”
The convention assembled in February 1898 in Mobile, and included a
broad spectrum of southern society: “members of the medical profession,
members of the legal fraternity, members of the cloth; the laity being
represented by men from great corporations—the railroads, boards of trade
139
and commerce, and cities interested in the vital interests to be discussed.”
Optimism at the outset of the convention was great:
The high importance of the quarantine convention now in session here
was today established for the first time and tonight it may safely be
predicted that the result of their deliberation will go much further
toward shaping future quarantine legislation of national, state and local
140
character than the most sanguine of its promoters hoped for.

It was also clear to the delegates that their action could have national
importance. As an observer reported, “The fact that [C]ongress will
recognize the final action of the convention has been telegraphed here in
many different ways from Washington, and it is even apparent that
141
Washington is trying to influence some of the delegates.”
136
137
138
139

140
141

Quarantine Laws Debated in Mobile, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 19, 1897, at 21.
Id.
Id.
Hearing Before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the H.R. on Bills (H.R. 4363 and
S. 2680) to Amend an Act Entitled “An Act Granting Additional Quarantine Powers and Imposing
Additional Duties upon the Marine Hospital Service”, 55th Cong. 20 (1898) [hereinafter 1898
Quarantine Powers Hearing] (statement of H.B. Horlbeck, Health Officer, Charleston,
S.C.).
Quarantine Laws Are Discussed, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 11, 1898, at 1.
Id.
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The final result of the convention reflected divided opinion on many
questions, but at the end delegates strongly favored national legislation of
some sort. The Atlanta Constitution trumpeted the headline “Home
Quarantine Loses the Fight: Mobile Convention Declares in Favor of
142
Those
National System,” though it noted, “Details Not Yet Perfected.”
details, in fact, would be a matter of some dispute at a congressional hearing
143
later that spring.

2. Memphis Convention, 1898
A self-styled “National Quarantine Convention” took place in Memphis
ten months later. At the invitation of Memphis merchants to “all
interested,” the convention delegates included “many prominent scientists,”
representatives from the Marine Service Hospital, and state and local health
144
145
boards. Of the 125 delegates, most were from southern states.
At the outset of the convention, the delegates received a telegraph
communicating the views of President William McKinley:
The [P]resident has received your communication inclosing [sic] a copy
of the resolutions recently adopted by the Memphis merchants’
exchange, in accordance with which a convention has been called to
meet in your city . . . . It affords me pleasure to assure you of the
[P]resident’s deep interest in this and other movements looking to the
prevention of the unhealthful and distressing condition referred to, and
to convey his best wishes for a most successful result of the deliberations
146
of the convention.

The Memphis group passed resolutions stating the need for national
control of quarantine, but they were unable to agree as a group with respect
to the specific legislation needed. Senator George Vest of Missouri, who was
unable to attend, wrote to the delegates that he did not believe that “any
legislation can be had doing away with the present complex and conflicting
147
conditions as to quarantine.”
The primary impediment, according to
Senator Vest, was state boards of health. They “are determined to retain
their jurisdiction as it now exists, and this is absolutely inconsistent with the
idea of such a national quarantine as will secure rapid and efficient
148
opposition to yellow fever.”

142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Home Quarantine Loses the Fight, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 12, 1898, at 1.
1898 Quarantine Powers Hearing, supra note 139, at 20–23, 29–30, 54, 86.
Quarantine Folk Will Meet Today, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 16, 1898, at 2.
Quarantine Convention Holds Three Sessions and Organizes, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 18, 1898,
at 1.
Id.
Quarantine Folk Will Meet Today, supra note 144.
Id.
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3. Chattanooga Convention, 1905
The most ambitious regional conference took place in Chattanooga in
November 1905, just as the epidemic of 1905 wound down. Nine governors,
two senators and eighteen congressmen from southern states attended the
“Southern Quarantine and Immigration Congress,” which sought regional
authority for interstate quarantine control together with their state boards of
149
health.
In the opening address, Governor John Cox of Tennessee reportedly
said the Convention should “provide for uniform quarantine legislation by
the Southern States, which should have the approval of the National
Congress and thus have the force of constitutional law, so that a citizen
going to any part of the South in times of epidemic should know exactly
150
what conditions he would meet.”
Over some objection on grounds of states’ rights—including by
Governor Vardaman of Mississippi, who warned the convention “against
151
taking any steps which will trample upon the autonomy of our States” —the
delegates attained remarkable unanimity on the need for congressional
action, as indicated by the headline below:

Atlanta Constitution, November 11, 1905

Unable to agree on an effective regional approach, delegates to the
convention concluded that Congress alone could solve the problems posed
by the shotgun quarantine. They hoped Congress would approve a
“national quarantine” law that would, in the words of the Atlanta Constitution,
“wipe[] out the state line foolishness with its inevitable display of opera
149
150
151

Governors Disagree, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1905, at 11.
Id.
Id.

398

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:2

bouffe officialism in the contingency of a dangerous epidemic, placing the
responsibility for quarantining and the care of the pestilence victims upon
152
At least some delegates, however,
the broad shoulders of Uncle Sam.”
believed the convention’s resolution would not remove any power of
153
municipal quarantine.
Congress took note of these three regional conventions when it
considered the extent of the federal government’s authority to preempt
state and local quarantine.

III.

LAW IN THE TIME OF QUARANTINE: DEBATING FEDERAL
AUTHORITY

If the gentleman will read all the decisions, and then undertake to write
down in words exactly where the national power ends and where the
State power begins on this subject of quarantine he will accomplish what
154
in my judgment nobody else has yet accomplished.

As we have seen, the shotgun quarantine made its first widespread
appearance during the 1878 epidemic. The shotgun quarantine also
featured prominently in the epidemics of 1897 and 1905, followed in each
instance by congressional efforts to address it. Proposed legislation would
have provided the federal government with explicit power to single out any
local quarantine and dismantle it. At no other time has such an extension of
federal quarantine power been considered or more fully vetted.
Two sessions of Congress—in 1898 and 1906—tackled head-on the
question whether the federal government could force a municipality to end
its shotgun quarantine. These sessions featured intense advocacy for
Congress to assume the power to override the local shotgun quarantine,
invitations which Congress ultimately declined. This Part examines these
legislative moments for a clearer view of the constitutional issues at stake.

152
153

154

The National Quarantine Law, ATLANTA CONST., April 7, 1906, at 8.
As the Atlanta Constitution summarized:
The exercise by the federal government of a supervisory control over state
quarantines will not take from the states or from the municipalities their inherent
rights to protect themselves. In the case of a municipality, for instance, the fact
that the federal government permits a train from an infected district to pass
through—proper precautions, of course, being taken—does not take away from
the municipality its right to protect itself by prohibiting the landing in its midst of
people from infected districts. And the same right would still remain with the
states, even with the federal government exercising the general supervision which
seems to be contemplated in the Chattanooga resolution.
Federal and State Cooperation, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 12, 1905, at D4.
William Hamilton Cowles, State Quarantine Laws and the Federal Constitution, 25 AM. L. REV.
45 (1891) (quoting an unnamed member of the House of Representatives).
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The key was to separate two questions: coastal quarantine, historically
under state control, and geographic quarantines imposed by inland towns.
The question of national control over seaport inspection dominated
congressional debate, but local quarantines in the interior were also of
significant concern. To be sure, much of the dissatisfaction with current law
was the lack of uniform methods to prevent the introduction of yellow fever
through importation of cargo and persons, and the worry that port cities
had incentives to promote their own commercial interests above all other
considerations. When a “uniform quarantine system” was urged, often the
advocate meant federal control over all state seaport inspections, to interdict
and disinfect incoming ships by application of uniform standards and
federal resources.
But an important component of the debate was how to stop the shotgun
quarantine—federal ability to lift inland quarantines imposed by cities and
towns. As I point out below, it is one thing to have the authority to impose
quarantine measures where states fail to act; it is quite another to prevent a
state or local government from imposing a quarantine that it believes
necessary for itself. Could the federal government deprive a state or local
government of this right?

A. The U.S. Supreme Court, Quarantine, and Interstate Commerce
The U.S. Supreme Court never explicitly addressed the shotgun
quarantine, nor has the Court ever set limits on the extent to which the
federal government might preempt any local quarantine. But in the midst
of yellow fever epidemics, it twice sent clear signals that Congress might
assert such power if it chose. This constitutional backdrop was significant
for debates over the reach of federal authority.
Exclusive state authority for quarantine and inspection stemmed from
earlier pronouncements by the Supreme Court, including Gibbons v.
155
Ogden.
Health laws internal to a state could not be preempted in the
name of interstate commerce:
They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation, which embraces
everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general
government: all which can be most advantageously exercised by the
States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every
description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a
State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries[, etc.], are
156
component parts of this mass.

155
156

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Id. at 203.
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In 1891, an article in the American Law Review explained the established
understanding of a state’s police power to protect the health of its residents:
It is well settled, upon the authorities, that the power to establish
quarantine regulations rests with the States and has not been
surrendered to the Federal government. The source of this power lies in
the general right of a State to provide for the health of its people, and
although the power when exercised may, in a greater or less degree,
affect commerce, yet quarantine laws are not enacted for that purpose,
157
but solely for preserving the public health.

The first case in which the Supreme Court invited Congress to act in
favor of national quarantine was Morgan’s Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board of
158
Health, decided in 1886. In that case, the Court upheld quarantine rules
imposed by Louisiana. But the Court also advised Congress that it might
preempt state and local quarantines:
[I]t may be conceded that whenever Congress shall undertake to provide
for the commercial cities of the United States a general system of
quarantine, or shall confide the execution of the details of such a system
to a National Board of Health, or to local boards, as may be found
expedient, all State laws on the subject will be abrogated, at least so far as
the two are inconsistent. But, until this is done, the laws of the State on
159
the subject are valid.

That pronouncement created a stir in legal circles, with a number of
160
writers hypothesizing how far-reaching that federal power might be. Much
of the analysis centered on Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
In 1877, the Court had established:
While we unhesitatingly admit that a State may pass sanitary laws, and
laws for the protection of life, liberty, health or property within its
borders; while it may prevent persons and animals suffering under
contagious or infectious diseases, or convicts, [etc.], from entering the
State; while for the purpose of self-protection it may establish quarantine,
and reasonable inspection laws . . . . It may not, under the cover of
exerting its police powers, substantially prohibit or burden either foreign
161
or inter-state commerce.

“[U]nder the cover of exerting its police powers” suggests a quarantine may
162
not be motivated by any factor other than the protection of public health.

157
158
159
160

161
162

H. Campbell Black, The Police Power and the Public Health, 25 AM. L. REV. 170, 181 (1891).
Morgan’s Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455 (1886).
Id. at 464.
See Cowles, supra note 154, at 45, 48; John H. Girdner, Alvah H. Doty & C.M. Drake, The
National Government and the Public Health, 165 N. AM. REV. 733 (1897); James H. McCall,
supra note 64; Charles Merz, Growth of Federalism, 10 NEW REPUBLIC 256 (1917); D.H.
Pingrey, Valid State Laws Incidentally Affecting Foreign and Interstate Commerce, 28 CENT. L.J.
336 (1889); U.O.B. Wingate, National Public Health Legislation, 504 N. AM. REV. 527 (1898).
R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1877).
Id.
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Did the dicta in Morgan’s Steamship mean that only duplicitous or
dishonest local quarantines might be preempted by the federal government?
At least one legal scholar thought so: “Of course if it can be said of any law
of this sort that it is clearly not a bona fide quarantine regulation, it would
163
But who would decide
interfere with commerce more than is necessary.”
164
if a shotgun quarantine was bona fide, and with what criteria?
In 1900, a
federal circuit court struck down a geographic quarantine of San Francisco’s
Chinatown, primarily on the authority of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,165 but also
because the twelve block cordon was an unreasonable restriction based
166
merely on unfounded rumors of bubonic plague.
167
The second case, Louisiana v. Texas, arose from alleged economic
embargoes against New Orleans. The state of Louisiana claimed that Texas
quarantines “place[d] an embargo on all interstate commerce between the
city of New Orleans and the state of Texas,” and that the quarantine was a
168
pretext for economic gain.
Texas closed its borders as soon as the first
case of yellow fever appeared in New Orleans, “the effect being to benefit
the commerce of Galveston and of other Texas cities at the expense of the
169
commerce of New Orleans.”
Louisiana claimed such actions violated the
federal Constitution and especially the clause regulating interstate
commerce.
Contemporaries understood what was at stake in the litigation. As the
case was pending, the Atlanta Constitution wrote:
The suit now pending, on a petition from Louisiana, to prevent the state
of Texas from placing an embargo upon interstate commerce from
Louisiana, seems to us a somewhat futile remedy for the troublesome
situation which has existed in the southwest during the summer as a
result of the existence of yellow fever in New Orleans and in Mississippi .
. . . Should the suit be decided in favor of Louisiana, how will the
decision be put in force without the active employment of federal troops;
and what will this result in but a total suspension of trade and business
relations between the wholesale and retail merchants of Louisiana and
170
the people of Texas?

The Supreme Court dismissed the suit on the ground that there was no
direct issue between the states. In order to constitute a controversy between
states, as is required for original jurisdiction, “something more must be put

163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

Cowles, supra note 154, at 66.
Id. (questioning whether state quarantine laws “interfere with commerce more than is
necessary”).
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900).
Texas’ Quarantine Rights, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1900, at 10.
Id.
A National Quarantine Law, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 10, 1899, at 4.
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forward than that the citizens of one state are injured by the
171
maladministration of the laws of another.”
Nonetheless, a concurring opinion suggested, once again, that Congress
might intervene in these circumstances. Justice John Harlan wrote:
[I]f the allegations of the bill be true, the Texas authorities have gone
beyond the necessities of the situation and established a quarantine
system that is absolutely subversive of all commerce between Texas and
Louisiana, particularly commerce between Texas and New Orleans. This
court has often declared that the States have the power to protect the
health of their people by police regulations directed to that end, and that
regulations of that character are not to be disregarded because they may
indirectly or incidentally affect interstate commerce. But when that
principle has been announced it has always been said that the police
power of a State cannot be so exerted as to obstruct foreign or interstate
commerce beyond the necessity for its exercise, and that the courts must
guard vigilantly against needless intrusion upon the field committed to
172
Congress.

The Supreme Court’s invitations for Congress to act became a game of
capture the flag in the pivotal debates of 1898 and 1906. Presidents William
McKinley, Teddy Roosevelt, and William Howard Taft believed the federal
government had the authority to override a state or local quarantine and
173
that it should use it.
Congressional debates over a federal quarantine
power that would preempt state and local quarantine orders are considered
below.

B. 1878–1893: First Reactions to the Shotgun Quarantine
The first efforts to counteract the southern shotgun quarantine were
indirect. Coastal quarantine dominated congressional debate; inland
quarantine received little attention. Containing shotgun quarantines would
be prominent aims of Congress in 1889 and 1906. For this reason, this Part
provides merely a brief overview of national legislation in preceding years.
The National Board of Health (1879–1883) receives cursory treatment
here because it had only advisory power and did not address the problems of
174
the local shotgun quarantine.
Congressional attention following the
devastating yellow fever epidemic of 1878 did not yet focus on the shotgun
quarantine problem, perhaps because it was not evident that this type of
171
172
173
174

Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. at 22.
Id. at 23–24 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See Maxey, supra note 7, at 394–95.
Accounts of the establishment and function of the National Board of Health describe its
jurisdictional limitations and the compromise necessary for its creation. See BLOOM, supra
note 15, at 206–07, 235, 245–46; ELLIS, supra note 15, at 60–82; HUMPHREYS, supra note
15, at 62–76; Cowles, supra note 154, at 70–71; Jerrold M. Michael, The National Board of
Health: 1879–1883, 126 PUB. HEALTH REP. 123, 127 (2011).
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quarantine would become an enduring practice. As a contemporary
summarized, “This law expired at the end of four years, a reenactment was
prevented, and Congress placed an epidemic fund in the hands of the
President to be used at his discretion in preventing and suppressing
175
Instead,
epidemics and maintaining quarantines at exposed points.”
members of Congress directed their efforts toward improving coastal
quarantine to prevent introduction of yellow fever from abroad.
Proponents of a national quarantine measure, known as the “yellow fever
bill,” justified the federal government’s intervention under its constitutional
right to regulate commerce and to protect the country from foreign
176
“invasions.” Opponents of the bill argued that it was unconstitutional and
177
a violation of state rights. Southerners, it seemed, preferred federal power
over local quarantine. Members of the National Board of Health, meeting
in Atlanta in 1879, reported:
[There is] very great indignation and dissatisfaction in the Southern
States at the fact that the Senate has refused to approve the National
Quarantine Bill. In case nothing is done by Congress they say that it will
be impossible to restrain the people, and that at the first intimations of
the approach of yellow fever from the South a rigid, destructive shotgun
quarantine system will be established by the people, who will take all law
178
into their own hands.

Ultimately, a much weaker bill created the National Board of Health,
one that satisfied opponents of federal power. The Board’s functions were
limited to advising state and local boards of health, publishing health
179
information, and investigating public health questions.
Even with the
weakened version, some health officials in Louisiana, Georgia, and Alabama
180
objected to the National Board’s potential “interference” in local affairs.
A memorial to Congress from Alabama stated that it was “neither wise nor
prudent for us to entrust the administration of quarantine to the hands of
any other health authorities than those who are of our own appointment
181
and directly responsible to our own people.”
Further, “the State can not
afford to allow this large grant of power, so nearly affecting the welfare of
our people, to be placed in the hands of the National Board of Health, or of

175
176
177
178
179
180
181

McCall, supra note 64, at 483.
Necessity for a National Quarantine, 14 FORUM 579 (1893); McCall, supra note 64, at 483.
McCall, supra note 64, at 483.
Yellow Fever: Southern Dissatisfaction at the Action of Congress: A Shot-Gun Quarantine to Be
Established, BOS. EVENING J., May 12, 1879.
McCall, supra note 64, at 483.
See Warner, supra note 46, at 426.
Id. (quoting Jerome Cochran et al., The Memorial of the Board of Health of the State of
Alabama, TRANSACTIONS OF THE MED. ASS’N OF ALABAMA: REP. OF THE STATE BD. OF
HEALTH (Apr. 1880), at 123–25).

404

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:2

182

Congress permitted the
any other agent of the federal government.”
183
Board to expire in 1883 at the conclusion of its initial appropriations.
The National Health Board did, at least, set a precedent for future public
health efforts by the federal government. Congress had given the Board
authority to provide money to state and local health boards “and to assume
quarantine powers when states did not appear competent or willing to do
184
so.”
One historian concluded that “[t]here was considerable confusion
among state and local boards over the limitations of the National Board’s
powers,” providing as an example that the “National Board could not
185
intervene until local boards had submitted itemized requests for funds.”
By 1893, the Marine Hospital Service (later renamed the U.S. Public
Health Service) was given explicit statutory authorization to use interstate
quarantine powers to prevent the introduction and spread of cholera, yellow
fever, smallpox, and plague, with jurisdiction soon extended to include
quarantine for all infectious and contagious diseases.186 These powers were
187
to be exercised “in cooperation” with state and local health agencies.
1890 saw the first federal legislation specific to interstate, as opposed to
188
coastal, quarantine.
Popularly known as the “Interstate Quarantine Law”
and titled “An act to prevent the introduction of contagious diseases from
one State to another,” the statute provided:
That whenever it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the
President that cholera, yellow-fever, small-pox, or plague exists in any
State or Territory, or in the District of Columbia, and that there is danger
of the spread of such disease into other States . . . he is hereby authorized
to cause the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate such rules and
regulations as in his judgment may be necessary to prevent the spread of
such disease from one State or Territory into another . . . and to employ
such inspectors and other persons as may be necessary to execute such
189
regulations to prevent the spread of such disease.

The statute directed the Supervising Surgeon General of the Marine
Hospital to prepare regulations “under the direction of the Secretary of the
190
Treasury.” It further provided a penalty for “any person who shall willfully
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

189
190

Id.
Id. at 413.
Id.
Id. at 414.
Act of Feb. 15, 1893, ch. 114, 27 Stat. 449.
Id.
It would be very interesting, though beyond the scope of this Article, to compare the
support and opposition to federal quarantine actions (either coastal or interstate
measures) with support and opposition to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, to see
how the focus on federal authority in public health played out compared with federal
authority in regulating private business.
Act of Mar. 27, 1890, ch. 51, 26 Stat. 31.
Id.
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violate any rule or regulation so made and promulgated,” designating such
acts as a misdemeanor punished by a fine of up to $500 or imprisonment for
191
But the federal government had no explicit authority
up to two years.
under the statute to override local regulations. “To prevent the spread” of
disease could not open channels of travel and commerce against the wishes
192
of local health officials.
In any event, there is no record that this statute
was ever enforced.
There was surprisingly little debate on this bill. Competing bills, both of
which failed, sought to create a national bureau and board of health, and to
assume federal control of port inspection and quarantine. These garnered
the lion’s share of attention, while the interstate bill passed with little
comment. One reason may have been the relative absence of yellow fever
193
the previous year.
In remarks before the American Medical Association, John B. Hamilton,
Supervising Surgeon General of the Marine-Hospital Service, explained that
Treasury regulations to implement the interstate quarantine power would be
formulated when yellow fever was known to exist in any state, “then
regulations for the prevention of its extension shall be framed by the
Supervising Surgeon-General. When these regulations are approved by the
Secretary of the Treasury and the President, they are binding upon the
general public, and specifically upon officers of the Government, common
194
carriers’ agents, officers, and employ[ee]s.”
As we shall see, the Treasury Department did not promulgate effective
regulations. One reason may have been doubts about the constitutional
limits of this authority. Another reason proved to be the impracticability of
any such federal intervention within a state—the absence of any funding or
entity empowered to carry out any such intervention. Congress would
consider legislation directing the Secretary of the Treasury to take steps to
counteract shotgun quarantines in 1898 and 1906.

C. The 1897 Epidemic: Toward a National Quarantine Law
The return of yellow fever in serious form in 1897 brought with it the
recurrence of local shotgun quarantines throughout the South. This, in
turn, pressured Congress once again to address the issue of interstate
191
192
193

194

Id.
Id.
U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, MARINE-HOSP. BUREAU, Doc. No. 1373, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
SUPERVISING SURGEON-GENERAL OF THE MARINE-HOSPITAL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1890 (1890), at 7 (“The country may congratulate itself on the fact
that no epidemic of yellow-fever, small-pox, or cholera has prevailed in any portion of our
country.”).
Id. at 28.
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quarantine. Reflecting the common view that yellow fever could not be
interdicted through port quarantine, in 1898 the Washington Post
emphasized that the shotgun quarantine would be an enduring problem,
absent national legislation:
The fact is that the South is suffering less from yellow fever than from the
curse of the barbarous shotgun quarantine—a system which is
notoriously inefficient as regards the protection of human life, and which
is potent only to the destruction of commerce and the paralysis of
civilization. . . . It is more than probable that, so long as the States retain
control of quarantine, the hideous performances of 1897 and 1898 will
195
be repeated with each fresh visitation of the disease.

In an article entitled “Business and Quarantine,” the Washington Post in
1898 considered a “national quarantine system” essential for the commercial
interests of the South:
The moral of the situation is that a national quarantine law is wanted, so
that a repetition of such conditions may be avoided. It is safe to assume
that with an effective national quarantine law in operation there would
be an end to the senseless shotgun quarantines and non-intercourse
196
regulations.

The Atlanta Constitution reported a “strong movement” toward a national
quarantine law: “The movement to secure legislation at the hands of the
United States [C]ongress to abolish the present system of state and local
quarantine and put into effect a national quarantine is taking definite
197
shape.” It noted that the absence of uniform quarantine practices caused
“great harm” by “putting it within the power of every little fever scared
community to stop the wheels of commerce and bring suffering and misery
198
to the homes of thousands . . . .”
Again, from the Washington Post:
Seriously, this shotgun quarantine system has reached such a stage in
some Southern States that it will surely ruin them unless it is reformed.
In some places it is no longer a justifiable precaution against possible
infection, but a matter of retaliation between county and parish, city and
town. It is a case of “you quarantine us, we’ll quarantine you,” and some
bumptious Board of Health or self-constituted authority on contagious
199
diseases may be relied upon to carry out the threat to the letter.

195
196
197
198
199

A Southern View of the Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1898, at 6.
Business and Quarantine, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1898, at 6.
A New Quarantine Law, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 4, 1897, at 4.
Id.
Southern Shotgun Quarantine, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1898, at 6.
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1. Public and Private Advocacy
Urban business interests in the South wanted authority in the national
government to stop local shotgun quarantines.
The Birmingham
Commercial Club, for instance, called for a “concerted movement in the
South” to advocate federal control of quarantine, denouncing “in
200
unmeasured terms the shotgun method of quarantine.”
The Club
initiated correspondence with the chambers of commerce, municipalities,
and state officials in all Southern states “with a view to inducing them to
bring pressure upon their United States Senators and Congressmen to
secure aid in enacting a law, empowering the Federal government . . . to
201
take charge of the quarantine regulations of the country . . . .”
That call was answered by local business organizations as well as political
202
leaders of the larger cities throughout the South.
Both the Atlanta
Chamber of Commerce and the city’s mayor advocated for national
quarantine, the latter noting that shotgun quarantines “are a disgrace to the
203
country and the states affected have been held up to scorn and ridicule.”
The mayor and leading businessmen of Atlanta traveled to Washington, D.C.
to urge Congress to enact a national quarantine law, reportedly receiving
“assurance of hearty co-operation from President McKinley,” who promised
204
to “send a special message urging its passage.”
Lobbyists representing business interests beset state legislatures as well as
Congress. In December 1897, the Georgia legislature overwhelmingly
passed a resolution asking its congressional delegation to push for a uniform
205
system of quarantine under federal control.
Governor William Atkinson
maintained that the resolution “proposed to surrender to the national
206
government an important power which is now vested in the state.”
Governor Atkinson explained:
The bill under consideration proposes to turn over to the national
government, whenever it sees fit to enact the necessary legislation, all
quarantine matters in this state, in case of an outbreak of yellow fever,
smallpox, cholera or plague. When this is done the liberty of the citizen
and the right of travel of our people are taken out of the hands of the

200
201
202
203

204
205
206

Shotgun Quarantine Denounced, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1897, at 1.
Id.
See, e.g., Macon Thinks Well of the Plan, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 9, 1897, at 2 (reporting a
Macon Chamber of Commerce resolution in favor of national quarantine).
Collier Roasts Quarantine Law, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 5, 1897, at 6; see also Chamber Favors
National System, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 6, 1897, at 8 (describing resolution passed by the
Atlanta Chamber of Commerce).
National Quarantine Law, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 24, 1897, at 3.
See A National Quarantine Law Favored by the Legislature, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 7, 1897, at 5
(describing the contents of the resolution).
All Bills Are Now Passed On, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 23, 1897, at 5.
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state government—in fact, the life and liberty of our people is placed in
207
the hands of officers appointed by the federal government.

The Governor nonetheless forwarded copies of the resolution to the
208
members of the Georgia Congressional delegation, along with his veto.

2. Deficiency of Existing Law: Hearings Before Congress
In February 1898, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce held hearings on the question of interstate quarantine—the first
209
time the shotgun quarantine featured in a Congressional debate.
Of five
separate bills in all, two of them—the “Caffery Bill” and the “Spooner Bill”—
210
received the most attention.
The Caffery Bill, introduced in the Senate by Donelson Caffery of
Louisiana, placed quarantine regulations “exclusively in the hands of the
national authorities,” and further provided that when yellow fever eluded
port quarantine and appeared within any state or territory, “the quarantine
regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury shall be supreme and have
precedence over state or municipal quarantine laws,” authorizing the
211
President to enforce them.
William P. Hepburn of Iowa, an eleven-term Republican congressman,
212
sponsored the Senate Caffery Bill in the House.
Importantly, he also
chaired the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce for
213
twelve years, from 1895 to 1909, and in that period was a champion of
increased federal interstate quarantine power. At the hearings, Hepburn
zeroed in on the problem of inland interstate quarantine. Guiding the
witnesses away from coastal seaport issues, Hepburn repeatedly questioned
witnesses about, as he termed it, “what some people have irreverently spoken
214
of as a ‘shotgun quarantine’.”
In Hepburn’s view, the current statutory scheme permitted the federal
government to impose quarantines to prevent the spread of disease from
one state into another, but not to lift quarantines imposed by state or local
authorities. The existing statutes were commonly interpreted to mean that
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214

Id.
National Quarantine Law: Gov. Atkinson Vetoes the Resolution of the Georgia Legislature, on the
Issue of State Rights, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 24, 1897, at 3.
1898 Quarantine Powers Hearing, supra note 139.
See Forward or Backward? N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1898, at 6 (describing the Spooner and
Caffery bills).
For A Stricter Quarantine, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 10, 1897, at 7 (quoting the Caffery Bill).
Walter Wyman, National Quarantine and Sanitation, 26 FORUM 684, 688 (1899).
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, HEPBURN, WILLIAM PETERS,
http://history.house.gov/People/Detail/14931.
1898 Quarantine Powers Hearing, supra note 139, at 91 (testimony of Sen. William P.
Hepburn). See also id. at 7, 12–14, 17, 92, 104.
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federal authorities were unable to act until requested to do so by a state or
municipal health board. But Hepburn believed greater federal authority
was necessary to prevent the local shotgun quarantine, which the Caffery Bill
would provide.
The Spooner Bill, by contrast, placed no absolute control over local
quarantines in federal hands, preferring instead a collaborative advisory
board consisting of state and local health officials. Supporters of this
measure criticized the Caffery Bill on the ground that it lacked such
representatives. As one witness characterized the Caffery Bill, “[I]t seeks to
make the Supervising Surgeon General the health dictator of the United
States, against whose mandates there is provided no right of appeal, and who
is controlled in his acts by no provision of law and is as unfettered in the
215
exercise of his power as is his ambition to rule.” The Spooner proposal, by
contrast, would provide for local input and would operate as a national
216
health association “where the majority rules.”
Another Committee member, Representative Hawley, posed the issue
this way:
[W]ithout regard to the facts as to whether fever exists or does not exist,
at the slightest rumor there will be established near towns and villages
what is properly known as the shotgun quarantine. The quarantine is
sometimes justified under conditions existing there, but frequently it is
not justified by any facts that exist or any disease which exists. That is a
case within the limits of a State, but in order to pass from one village to
another in the State it is important that interstate commerce should pass
217
in order to maintain commerce between those two villages.”

The Committee heard testimony from prominent physicians and public
health officials. Dr. Alvah H. Doty, director of quarantine for the port of
218
New York and a supporter of the Spooner bill, sought to distance state
health boards from the recent “shotgun quarantines in the south,” causing
“the trouble that interfered with the transportation of goods, commerce, or
219
anything of that character.”
Dr. Doty attributed the local shotgun quarantine to a difference in
opinion among local health officers:

215
216

217
218
219

Id. at 49 (statement of Joseph Y. Porter, State Health Officer of Florida).
Id. at 6 (statement of Dr. Alvah H. Doty of New York) (“I only desire to dwell on one
thing particularly, and that is the fact that this power is given to one man to decide; that
there is absolutely no deliberation in this matter at all. You will notice throughout the
bill teams with penalties and threats. There is not a thing in that bill which tends to
cooperate with the State or municipal authorities. There is not a State or municipal
authority throughout the country that is not discouraged after reading the bill.”).
Id. at 17.
Alvah H. Doty, The Federal Government and the Public Health, N. AM. REV. 498, 543 (May
1898).
1898 Quarantine Powers Hearing, supra note 139, at 5–6.
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It is the fact that in Texas and other places where they had shotgun
quarantines that health officers differed in their opinion. They might be
all good, but the result was a popular clamor and things of that character.
They formulated rules which were unjust. We all believe there should be
some Government supervision and regulations to harmonize these
things, but we do not believe the Federal Government should interfere
220
with the details of these local health matters.

Chairman Hepburn pressed witnesses on the interstate commerce issue,
but he could not get a direct answer. Dr. H. B. Horlbeck, a health officer
from Charleston, South Carolina, defended the right of his city to impose a
221
quarantine against passengers and traffic. Hepburn asked whether “[t]he
same right you would assume to yourself in Charleston every other city on
the road from New Orleans to the city of Washington on the Coast Line
222
would exercise, would they not?”
THE CHAIRMAN: In that way you would destroy all travel and all commerce
between the city of Washington and the city of Charleston? . . . If you can
exercise this authority and because of your force hold a man or hold his
property there four or five days until you subjected to quarantine?
DR. HORLBECK: We want a little quarantine; we only want to be satisfied it
is all right.
THE CHAIRMAN: Suppose you would have this; then if every other city
would have the same and every other village had a quarantine, would you
not entirely destroy by the exercise of that kind of power all
communication between the different cities in the United States because
of the fear you may have?
DR. HORLBECK: I do not think practically we would exercise it. . . .
THE CHAIRMAN: You are insisting, however, upon the power to do it?
DR. HORLBECK: I think we ought to have that because there may be some
person, even if the Marine-Hospital Service employed the best talent to
assist them, they may be wrong; all human agency is liable to that. . . . I
do not think they ought to have the final power to permit those things to
come into our borders without our being permitted to say anything
223
about it.

In addition to highlighting the distrust of the federal government’s
expertise, Horlbeck also pointed out the impracticality of federal

220
221

222
223

Id. at 6.
Id. at 26 (“Now, last summer we had in our town quite a great deal of apprehension,
which was natural, on account of the experience of the past with this dread disease. On
14th September we got an official notice from Mobile and New Orleans of the presence
of yellow fever. We had known of its previously being on the coast. At once the mayor of
the city, the chairman of the board of health, and myself got together and got the best
police for detectives we could get, and every train of people coming to our town was
examined, and if they had a proper certificate we allow them in. There were no barriers
other than showing they were not from an infected district.”).
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27–28.
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intervention at the local level. “I do not think it might be wise at any time to
have the Government undertake [quarantine] locally, and I do not
think . . . that in the local boards of health in 10,000 towns and villages and
townships you should have Federal officers; you would break the nation
224
almost.”
Representative T. M. Mahon of Pennsylvania appeared as one of the few
witnesses in favor of the Caffery Bill. Often, he interrogated members of the
Committee, rather than the other way around:
During the last trouble with yellow fever, a man traveling there, perfectly
well, was pulled off at the State line, at the mouth of the shotgun, and
not allowed to go into another State, and not allowed to go back. Will
you tell me the action of the United States, under the powers of the
Constitution regulating interstate commerce, does not have power to
interfere in behalf of that citizen and say that no such treatment shall be
225
accorded him?

When questioned by Representative James Mann (R-Ill.), however, Mahon
posited that the federal government’s authority could only function at state
borders:
MR. MANN: All of the transportation lines which run from Cincinnati or
Chicago, or those cities and that territory, run through Tennessee going
south to New Orleans. Suppose the State board of health simply says that
they have yellow fever in the South, and they will not permit
transportation to go through Tennessee?
MR. MAHON: Under the interstate commerce law, what is the right due
your State, then? It is as clear as the sun under the heavens that one
State has no right to interfere—
MR. MANN: But suppose they do?
MR. MAHON: Then [the Caffery Bill] provides that this bureau shall
establish on the State line, to protect your people, quarantine stations,
and that all passengers shall be examined there, all freight and
passengers shall be stopped, and freight disinfected, and then sent on its
way.
....
MR. MANN: To that extent, then, it would override the State authority?

224

225

Id. at 31. The point was emphasized in an exchange with Rep. Robert Davey (D-La.):
MR. DAVEY: Is it not a fact during the late epidemic always the board of health was
entirely powerless outside of such municipalities?
DR. HORLBECK: I have heard they allowed nothing to go through and stopped
everything in the most senseless fashion, possibly through terror.
MR. DAVEY: Is it not a fact the State boards of health of Louisiana and the State
board of Texas—the health officers—were not allowed to meet; that the people
stopped the trains in between?
DR. HORLBECK: I am afraid you will have the same thing if any department had
control.
1898 Quarantine Powers Hearing, supra note 139, at 30–31.
Id. at 39.
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MR. MAHON: Yes, sir; and should override it. You see, in that panic down
226
there people lost their heads.

Finally, Mahon insisted that passengers, as well as freight, were protected
by the federal Constitution’s Commerce Clause:
MR. MAHON: Am I not a subject of commerce?
THE CHAIRMAN: No.
MR. MAHON (continuing): Going from State to State, I am as fully
protected under that interstate-commerce clause of the Constitution as a
227
barrel of flour.”

Representative Mahon centered Congress’s power over interstate travel
in the Commerce Clause. That transportation of persons was “commerce”
228
first appears in Gibbons v. Ogden.
Mahon’s idea is similar to the nascent
“right to travel,” dating back to the Passenger Cases of 1849, in which Justice
Taney wrote that “[w]e are all citizens of the United States; and, as members
of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through
229
every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.”
An
important difference, however, is that the shotgun quarantine excluded all
230
travelers, including residents of a state attempting to return home.
As Hepburn and the Committee viewed it, only the Caffery Bill provided
room for the federal government to intervene directly in a local quarantine.
It would “prevent unnecessary restrictions upon interstate commerce” by,
among other means, authorizing the Marine Service Hospital to issue
231
federal travel permits for both passengers and freight.
Any person
interfering with the permit from the federal authorities would be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor.
As one critic of the bill characterized,
“[t]herefore, any health officer who shall disregard a permit which he
226
227

228

229
230
231

Id. at 44.
Id. at 46. The uncertain reach of the Interstate Commerce Clause in this period received
substantial attention from legal scholars. See, e.g., H. Campbell Black, The Police Power and
the Public Health, 25 AM. L. REV. 170, 175 (1891) (highlighting the limitations of police
power in inspecting the purity of food products due to the constraints of interstate
commerce); Charles A. Culberson, The Supreme Court and Interstate Commerce, 24 AM. L.
REV. 25, 25 (1890) (observing that the “difficult and perplexing subject” of interstate
commerce is hotly disputed in courts across the nation); D.H. Pingrey, Valid State Laws
Incidentally Affecting Foreign and Interstate Commerce, 28 CENT. L.J. 336, 336 (1889) (noting
that the questions surrounding the interstate commerce clause are complex and
difficult).
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189–90 (1824) (explaining that the word
“commerce” should not be interpreted so narrowly that it excludes the idea of
navigation).
Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, J., dissenting).
Id.
1898 Quarantine Powers Hearing, supra note 139, at 22–24 (1898) (statement of Dr. H.
Horlbeck, Health Officer of Charleston, S.C.). There was apparently no provision for
individuals who obtained a permit fraudulently or who subsequently developed yellow
fever.
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regards dangerous to his community shall wear stripes in a common prison
232
or penitentiary and pay a fine which may beggar him.”
Hepburn was unmoved: “Why is it not a better plan to say that the
General Government will carry on a quarantine system, and that nobody else
233
shall interfere with it?”
As an anti-climax to the first sustained congressional investigation of the
shotgun quarantine, all of the bills presented that session were destined to
fail. The declaration of war against Spain and the contemplated invasion of
234
Cuba put aside any further consideration of the shotgun quarantine.
Legislation addressing it would not be taken up until the next (and last)
epidemic of yellow fever ravaged the South, and after U.S. troops in Cuba
235
had been decimated by the disease.
In the interim, advocates continued
to press the need for interstate intervention by the federal government:
When the comfort and commerce of millions of people are at stake it
should not be left with the power of isolated communities to set all in
confusion and to institute a reign of terror. The day of the local shotgun
quarantine has gone by, and the time has come for our people to act
236
upon common sense principles.

As would be the case in the fifty-ninth Congress, however, such dire
pronouncements failed to secure the needed legislation.

D. The 1905 Epidemic: A Narrow Defeat for Federal Intervention
The epidemic of 1905 proved once again that state governments in the
South could not control local shotgun quarantines. Louisiana threatened to
use troops to lift local quarantines after the State Board of Health ordered
restrictions on travel and traffic removed, denouncing those quarantines as
237
“illegal . . . and inhuman.”
In the opinion of the Washington Post, “[t]he
232
233
234

235

236
237

Id. at 22.
Id. at 45 (statement of W.P. Hepburn, Chairman, Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce).
See id. at 108. The last action in the Senate was a committee’s proposed amendment, as
follows: “Nothing in this act shall be construed to interfere with the right of any State to
protect its citizens from infectious or contagious diseases by such rules and regulations as
the authorities of said State may deem necessary and which do not conflict with the rules
and regulations made by the Secretary of the Treasury, as hereinbefore provided, to
prevent the introduction of infectious or contagious diseases into the United States from
foreign countries or the spread of such diseases.” National Quarantine Bill—Mr. Vest Makes
an Earnest Speech in Behalf of National Control of Health Laws, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 16,
1898, at 7.
The specific legislation referenced here is discussed below. For background on the effects of the yellow fever during the Spanish-American war, see Alfred Jay Bollet, Military
Medicine in the Spanish-American War, 48 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 293.
Extending the National Quarantine, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 22, 1899, at 4.
Fight on Quarantine: Louisiana May Use Troops to Lift Local Embargoes, WASH. POST, Aug. 9,
1905, at 1.
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indications are that unless an early break occurs in the shotgun quarantine
238
in Louisiana, something very like war will break out in this State.”
The important question of control of interstate commerce, left hanging
in 1898, now could not be avoided. The denouement of the interstate
quarantine question arrived in 1906, when a conference committee of
Congress rejected a provision that would have imposed federal control over
rail travel within states.
The 1906 congressional session occurred against the backdrop of the
Chattanooga regional conference, with its call for national quarantine
authority, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Louisiana v. Texas in
1900. With the exception of Texas and a divided congressional delegation
239
from Georgia, the South was united in support of federal intervention.
The Chicago Record-Herald concluded it proved “the old State’s rights
240
doctrine is a creed outworn.”
For national control of border and seaport entry, the crowning
achievement of the 1906 Congress was “The National Quarantine Law of
241
1906.”
Over the strenuous objection of New York public health officers,
the Act at last provided for full national control over port and international
border quarantine stations, with authorization to purchase any facilities still
operated by states. But the measure was nearly derailed by a last-minute
attempt to provide for federal quarantine authority within states. As the
Atlanta Constitution reported:
For some weeks the passage of the bill was jeopardized by an effort to
incorporate a clause which would have given the government control of
interstate quarantines, the idea being to eliminate the possibility of the
old drastic regulations enforced by the shotgun. In the end this
provision was stricken, the majority being of the opinion that if the
marine hospital service were given full control of port stations the
entrance of disease would be rendered next to impossible, and that there
would be no development of complications giving rise to interstate and
242
local squabbles.

The dispute centered on the insertion of an additional provision, known
as the new “Section 7,” by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
238

239
240

241
242

Id. The shotgun quarantine also extended outside of the deep South. See also Officers
Clash over Fever Law, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 24, 1905, at 2 (reporting that Illinois state
health officials ordered federal quarantine officers not to enter Cairo, Illinois).
See e.g., 40 CONG. REC. 5387, 5389 (1906) (statement of Rep. Jack Beall); National
Quarantine Favored by the House, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 4, 1906, at 5.
Not a Decadent Doctrine, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1906, at 6 (quoting the Chicago Record-Herald
(1906)). On the other hand, resistance to federal authority over quarantine extended to
the Illinois Board of Health. See Officers Clash Over Fever Law, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 24,
1905, at 2.
Act of June 19, 1906, ch. 3433, 34 Stat. 299 (1906) (“An Act to further protect the public
health and make more effective the national quarantine.”).
Federal Quarantine Control, ATLANTA CONST., June 26, 1906, at 6.
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Commerce. This section empowered federal authorities to prevent the
243
If federal authorities certified
interruption of rail traffic within a state.
that a train’s passengers and cargo were free from infection, no state or local
government could prevent passage through the state without risking
criminal prosecution. The measure provided only for “pass through”
244
jurisdiction; it would not override a wholly local shotgun quarantine. But
even this limited “pass through” clause was too much for opponents.
William P. Hepburn, still chairman of the House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee (his tenure would span from 1892 to 1908), had
made it clear that he would not report any bill that did not provide for an
245
effective federal interstate quarantine.
As the Washington Post reported,
“the majority of the committee insisted that if the Federal government
appropriates a large sum of money for quarantine there must also be given
enough power to prevent shotgun quarantines similar to that Mississippi
246
enforced recently . . . .”
In the House of Representatives, only twenty-six votes were cast against
the Committee bill, but spirited debate by dissenters featured “sharp
247
exchanges” and lengthy discourses on constitutional law.
The additional
feature of the bill, some argued, would jeopardize the original purpose to
248
mandate federal control of seaport and land border quarantine.
While
apparently an accurate observation on the political alignments at issue, that
alignment had nothing to do with the merits of whether federal action in
inland areas was a good idea.

243

244
245
246
247
248

40 CONG. REC. 5387, 5389 (1906) (statement of Rep. Jack Beall). The amended text
provided:
SEC 7. That every common carrier, engaged in interstate commerce, shall, under
such regulations, restrictions, and safeguards as may be promulgated by the
Secretary of the Treasury, receive, carry, and transport through any State or
Territory necessary to complete the journey or carriage into a State wherein
delivery or debarkation may be lawful, all passengers, freight, or baggage which
may have been discharged and properly certified in accordance with the
regulations of the Public Health and Marine-Hospital Service; and every person
interfering with or obstructing such carrier or any passenger or any
instrumentality of commerce in any such carriage or journey shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and on conviction thereof be punished by a fine not exceeding $300
or be imprisoned for a period not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion
of the court: Provided, That this section shall not be construed as giving authority
to any person to debark or unloaded freight in any locality contrary to the lawful
regulations thereof.
S. 4250, April 10, 1906.
National Quarantine Bill Discussed by Committee, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1906, at 4.
Id.
National Quarantine Favored by the House, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 4, 1906, at 5.
Id.
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As Representative Jack Beall of Texas stated, “[w]e protest against this
section as a vicious, unwaranted [sic], and unnecessary interference with the
249
right of a State to protect its people:”
Section 7 is in contradiction to all the other sections. It is not a
quarantine section; it is a commercial section. It places no embargo
upon the movement of persons and property from the infected to
noninfected points, but facilitates such movement. It does not lessen the
opportunities for the transmission of disease; it increases them. It will
not check yellow fever; it will spread it. It does not look to the protection
of life and health of the people; it protects the railroads. It is not
responsive to the demands of the people; it is in obedience to the behests
of the transportation companies. It subordinates the rights of the States
and the lives of human beings to the right of railroad companies to pile
250
up earnings to satisfy the greed of stockholders.

Supporters, by contrast, pointed to a recent incident highlighting the
need for national intervention. The governor of Arkansas prevented a train
251
carrying refugees from Louisiana to pass through the state.
In response,
Representative Beall decried the combined efforts of Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Alabama to upset the constitutional scheme:
Our regret over this lamentable result is increased by the reflection that
in other days the people of the South have stood steadfastly as the
defenders of the faith of the fathers, while to-day [sic] this crusade for
the dishonor of the States is led by those coming from what has
252
heretofore been the very citadel of State sovereignty.

The House voted to approve the bill by a comfortable margin (172–22),
but the Senate bill, previously passed unanimously, had not included any
interstate quarantine measure, and indeed the Senate appears not to have
253
considered it, as Section 7 was a late addition to the House measure. The
Senate had approved the original bill on April 2. Because the House
measure included Section 7 while the Senate bill did not, the two bills were
sent to a reconciliation committee.
The showdown over interstate quarantine thus moved to the House254
Senate conference committee. That committee agreed to strike Section 7.
Although the conference report did not explain the committee’s reasoning,
255
apparently the committee’s members were deadlocked for some time.

249
250
251
252
253
254
255

40 CONG. REC. 5387, 5389 (1906) (statement of Rep. Jack Beall).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5392.
H.R. REP. NO. 59-4920, at 1 (1906) (Conf. Rep.).
Quarantine Bill in Peril, ATLANTA CONST., June 7, 1906, at 7 (“There is decided danger that
the quarantine bill intended to give federal aid in yellow fever quarantines and which has
passed the [S]enate and [H]ouse, will fail, because of a deadlock among the conferees on
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Against this opposition to Section 7, the conference committee preferred to
preserve the Act’s primary purpose to assume national control over port
256
quarantine.
Debates in the House on both April 3 and April 17 featured lengthy
analysis of the conflict between the federal government’s authority over
interstate commerce and traditional state police power over local public
257
health.
In Congress, W.C. Adamson, Representative from Columbus,
Georgia, and a member of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee, defended the local quarantine:
There is no reason for conflict of authority. It is the right and duty of the
federal government to exclude infection from the entire country and to
regulate its transmission among the states, territories and Indian tribes,
provided, as the [S]upreme [C]ourt says, it is really a precaution to
protect health and not a sham or pretense to promote commerce at the
expense of health.
If the federal government neglects its duty and a state fears danger, the
state may prevent the entrance of anything or anybody into its borders,
except for rapid transit through the state, and the more rapid the better.
No power in earth can override the state in the exercise of such
authority. If the state sees no danger, a town or a county may exercise
the same authority under the same regulations, the difference in the
three being in the extent of territory covered and not inefficiency, and
258
impotency of authority.

The Marine Hospital Service, meanwhile, operated under Treasury
259
Department regulations that were issued piecemeal as yellow fever spread.
Compiled from telegrams and circulars, the regulations were limited to
localities where federal health officers had been invited to help, and
consisted of directions for the establishment of refugee camps,
dissemination of reports of yellow fever cases, and inspection of trains at
260
state lines.

256

257
258
259
260

the seventh section of the bill. . . . A movement has been inaugurated lately, however, to
get the section mentioned withdrawn rather than defeat the bill.”).
Federal Quarantine Control, ATLANTA CONST., June 26, 1906, at 6 (“For some weeks the
passage of the bill was jeopardized by an effort to incorporate a clause which would have
given the government control of interstate quarantines, the idea being to eliminate the
possibility of the old drastic regulations enforced by the shotgun. In the end this
provision was stricken, the majority being of the opinion that if the marine hospital
service were given full control of port stations the entrance of disease would be rendered
next to impossible, and that there would be no development of complications giving rise
to interstate and local squabbles.”).
40 CONG. REC. 4661–4685 (1906); 40 CONG. REC. 5388 (1906).
Adamson Talks on Quarantines, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 11, 1905, at 3.
See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 48, 193 (referencing various Treasury Department regulations).
See J. H. White, Synopsis of the Interstate Quarantine Regulations of the Treasury Department, in
U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, MARINE-HOSP. SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERVISING
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Constitutional doubts about the federal government’s interstate
quarantine authority seem to have receded, but members of Congress
recognized that effective implementation was not possible. As a practical
matter, congressional leaders concluded there was very little the federal
government could do to suppress the shotgun quarantine.
Symbolically, some viewed the bill to have redeemed the South with
respect to its reintegration into the union, despite the failure of the
interstate quarantine provision. The Louisville Times reported:
It is in a double sense a victory for the south, first in the establishment of
the fact that the south has come to recognize that it is a part of the
national government, and as such, is entitled to her share in the benefits
of the national government . . . . If the law goes into effect it will save the
south thousands in commerce, and scores of lives. It will put an end to
the disgrace brought by demagogues who seek the critical occasion of
epidemic peril to exploit themselves at the threatened peril of their own
261
and their sister states.

This sustained national debate centered on where state police power
ended in matters of public health. The legislative failure in Congress did
not necessarily reflect an understanding of constitutional limitation, but
instead was a political compromise. The failure also reflected the federal
government’s limited agency resources—the proponents of greater federal
authority simply could not imagine how the goals of federal intervention
might be accomplished.
Because the United States would experience no further epidemics of
yellow fever after 1905, the issue of interstate quarantine had no urgency
and never again received the sustained attention of Congress. Discovery of
the mosquito vector would eventually lessen the need for federal
intervention in local quarantine matters. As the Washington Post noted in
1916, “[w]hen yellow fever was traced directly to the responsible mosquito
the shotgun was laid aside, and with it departed a chill of fear fully as
262
prevalent and almost as much to be feared as the disease itself.”

261
262

SURGEON-GENERAL OF THE MARINE-HOSPITAL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR 1898, at 412–14 (1899) and P. H. Bailhache, A Précis of the United States
Quarantine Regulations for Domestic Ports with Reference to Preventing the Introduction of Yellow
Fever into the United States, in U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, MARINE-HOSP. SERVICE, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE SUPERVISING SURGEON-GENERAL OF THE MARINE-HOSPITAL SERVICE OF THE
UNITED STATES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1898, at 414–24 (1899) for a summary of regulations
during the 1897 epidemic. See also U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BUREAU OF PUB. HEALTH AND
MARINE-HOSP. SERV., supra note 48, for a summary of regulations issued during the 1905
epidemic.
The National Quarantine Law, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 7, 1906, at 8 (quoting The Louisville
Times’s discussion “of the passage of the bill by the lower house”).
Value of Quarantine, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1916, at 4.
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MODERN ECHOES: FROM QUARANTINE TO SYRIAN REFUGEES

Where matters stood in 1906 is essentially where they stand today. If a
state fails to act in the face of a threatened epidemic or requests assistance,
the federal government can intervene. But if a state or local government
acts in a way that is unnecessary or excessive, we are just as bewildered about
federal authority as in the days of the shotgun quarantine.
There is little reason to think the modern Supreme Court would view the
matter differently than it did in both 1886 and 1900. The federal
government’s power to override state-imposed quarantine regulations is not
restricted by the federal constitution. The seminal difference, of course, is
the intervention of the due process revolution of the mid-twentieth century.
Courts can and will review individual quarantine orders on due process
grounds, requiring state and local governments to respect the civil liberties
263
of persons it segregates from the community.
Such review, however,
264
occurs only after a quarantine or isolation order is in place or has ended.
265
Local health officials are not required to seek court approval in advance.
Viewed in this light, Ebola (and perhaps, now, the Zika virus) might be
seen to pose the same problem as the yellow fever shotgun quarantine:
Uninformed or self-interested populations allow political or commercial
interests to overcome expert medical opinion, in a manner highly disruptive
to national interests. Some states imposed arguably more expansive Ebola
quarantine policies than were necessary to protect public health, disrupting
266
interstate commerce and travel as well as violating civil liberties.
Public health law in the United States is still largely a matter of state
authority. If anything, local quarantine is infinitely more complicated today
by new means of travel, particularly airplanes and the automobile. It is one
thing to concede federal quarantine authority at national borders; it is quite
another to prevent or preempt state and local quarantines or other

263
264
265

266

Polly Price, Quarantine and Liability in the Context of Ebola, 131 PUB. HEALTH REP. 500, 501
(2016).
Id.
A recent comparison is the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, which grants
public health powers to state and local public health authorities. THE CTRS. FOR LAW &
THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA),
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/ModelLaws/MSEHPA.php (“[T]o ensure a strong,
effective . . . response mechanism[] to public health emergencies . . . while also
respecting individual rights.”).
See Matt Flegenheimer et al., Under Pressure, Cuomo Says Ebola Quarantines Can Be Spent at
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2014, at A24 (highlighting criticisms and opposition to New
Jersey’s Ebola quarantine initiative); see also CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, Interim Table of State Ebola Screening and Monitoring Policies for Asymptomatic
Individuals, www.cdc.gov/phlp/publications/topic/ebola.html (enumerating state Ebola
quarantine rules).
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protective barriers that are unnecessary and beyond a legitimate need, even
if those actions might be motivated solely by panic and fear.

A. Federal Quarantine Authority Today
It is understood today that the federal government derives its quarantine
and isolation authority from the Commerce Clause. The modern statute
provides:
The Surgeon General, with the approval of the Secretary, is authorized to
make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to
prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable
diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from
267
one State or possession into any other State or possession.

The statute limits federal quarantine power to U.S. entry points and to
persons believed “to be moving or about to move from a State to another
268
State . . . .”
The CDC is tasked with federal quarantine orders; to date it
has exercised that authority only rarely, and only for individuals rather than
269
groups or populations.
For example, the CDC maintains a “Do Not
Board” list preventing air travel for patients with any infectious disease that
is a potential public health threat to passengers, including infectious
270
tuberculosis. Persons are added to the Do Not Board list only with reliable
medical information provided by a state public health official and following
a reviewed approval process by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
271
Services.

267
268

269

270
271

42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 264(d)(1) (2012) (“Regulations prescribed under this section may provide for
the apprehension and examination of any individual reasonably believed to be infected
with a communicable disease in a qualifying stage and (A) to be moving or about to move
from a State to another State; or (B) to be a probable source of infection to individuals
who, while infected with such disease in a qualifying stage, will be moving from a State to
another State.”).
See Criteria for Requesting Federal Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes,
Including for Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,400, 16,400–02 (Mar. 27, 2015)
(listing procedures and criteria for restricting individuals with communicable disases
from traveling). This Notice describes the tools the federal government has to ensure
that people with serious contagious diseases that pose a public health threat do not board
commercial flights or enter into the United States without a public health evaluation.
Id.
See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, About Quarantine and Isolation (Aug. 28,
2014), http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/QuarantineIsolation.html (describing specific
travel restriction requirements for those who have a communicable disease); see also
Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION: MMWR WEEKLY (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/mm5737a1.htm (reviewing a variety of statistical figures relating to CDC
requests to place people on the Do Not Board list between 2007 and 2008).
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There is no explicit authorization to impose a quarantine that operates
wholly within a state, and the statutory scheme appears to prohibit the
272
abrogation of a state or locally-imposed quarantine. Instead, Congress has
emphasized cooperation with states:
The Secretary is authorized to accept from State and local authorities any
assistance in the enforcement of quarantine regulations made pursuant
to this chapter which such authorities may be able and willing to provide.
The Secretary shall also assist States and their political subdivisions in the
prevention and suppression of communicable diseases and with respect
to other public health matters, shall cooperate with and aid State and
local authorities in the enforcement of their quarantine and other health
regulations, and shall advise the several States on matters relating to the
273
preservation and improvement of the public health.

The Code of Federal Regulations permits unspecified intervention in the
event that measures by state or local health authorities “are insufficient to
prevent the spread of any of the communicable diseases from such State or
possession to any other State or possession,” although the context of the
274
provision emphasizes control of livestock and other animals, not persons.
Moreover, that provision addresses measures deemed “insufficient” but not
275
measures deemed excessive—the shotgun quarantine problem.

272

273
274

275

See 42 U.S.C. § 264(e) (2012) (“Nothing in this section or section 266 of this title, or the
regulations promulgated under such sections, may be construed as superseding any
provision under State law (including regulations and including provisions established by
political subdivisions of States), except to the extent that such a provision conflicts with
an exercise of Federal authority under this section or section 266 of this title.”).
42 U.S.C. § 243(a) (2012) (appearing under the subchapter heading entitled, “General
grant of authority for cooperation”).
42 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2000) (“Whenever the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention determines that the measures taken by health authorities of any State or
possession (including political subdivisions thereof) are insufficient to prevent the spread
of any of the communicable diseases from such State or possession to any other State or
possession, he/she may take such measures to prevent such spread of the diseases as
he/she deems reasonably necessary, including inspection, fumigation, disinfection,
sanitation, pest extermination, and destruction of animals or articles believed to be
sources of infection.”).
See 42 C.F.R. § 70.3 (2003) (“A person who has a communicable disease in the
communicable period shall not travel from one State or possession to another without a
permit from the health officer of the State, possession, or locality of destination, if such
permit is required under the law applicable to the place of destination. Stop-overs other
than those necessary for transportation connections shall be considered as places of
destination.”); see also 42 C.F.R. § 70.6 (2003) (“Regulations prescribed in this part
authorize the detention, isolation, quarantine, or conditional release of individuals, for
the purpose of preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread of the
communicable diseases listed in an Executive Order setting out a list of quarantinable
communicable diseases . . . .”) (applying to persons entering the United States). None of
these provisions explicitly authorize a “Do Not Board” list, and, in fact, CDC relies on
Transportation Safety Administration (“TSA”) authority for purposes of “requesting” that
TSA place individuals on the public health “Do Bot board” list. See Criteria for
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We have today the same balance of power by statute: an affirmative
power to intervene to prevent the spread of disease does not imply a
negative power to preempt a local quarantine. Under the Commerce
Clause, Congress could authorize such intervention within states, but it has
276
The federal government has been hesitant to exercise this
not done so.
authority without statutory authorization. One difference, however, is that
in the nineteenth century the administration of quarantine would not have
been considered a regulatory power of the federal government, whereas
277
today this authority is rarely questioned. The federal government’s power
to intervene in state public health measures is unnecessarily limited by
Congress. Inherent authority resides in the Dormant Commerce Clause.

B. Ebola Controversies, and a Preview of the Zika Virus?
In late 2014, Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey led a group of four
states to publicly declare stricter quarantines in their states than either the
278
CDC or the World Health Organization recommended. Two lawsuits seek
damages for Ebola quarantines imposed in these states. To be sure, these
quarantines were not remotely equivalent to the exclusion cordons of the
shotgun quarantine. State governments did not turn away persons at
political boundaries or otherwise prevent entry (despite calls to do so), but
the number of persons potentially exposed to Ebola were low and easy to
capture through airport screening of those returning from Ebola-infected
areas in western Africa. Nonetheless, the actions of these State governors
engendered substantial debate about the desirability of a federal role.

276

277
278

Requesting Federal Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, Including for Viral
Hemorrhagic Fevers, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,400, 16,4001 (Mar. 27, 2015) (explaining the legal
authorities supporting this program). The Centers for Disease Control proposed new
federal quarantine regulations through notice and comment rulemaking. The final rule
was published January 19, 2017, Control of Communicable Diseases, 82 FR 6890 (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 70, 71), but at time of publication the fate of the rules were uncertain due to pending Congressional review. See Rob Stein, CDC Seeks Controversial New
Quarantine Powers to Stop Outbreaks, NPR (Feb. 2, 2017, 4:47 AM), http://www.npr.org/
sections/health-shots/2017/02/02/512678115/cdc-seeks-controversial-new-quarantinepowers-to-stop-outbreaks.
Arjun K. Jaikumar, Note, Red Flags in Federal Quarantine: The Questionable Constitutionality of
Federal Quarantine After NFIB v. Sebelius, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 677, 689–90 (2014) (“The
Court maintained, however, that state quarantine laws . . . could indeed be preempted by
Congress if it so desired.”).
Id. at 686, 714 (analyzing the legal history of how the federal government has
implemented quarantines).
Jess Bidgood & Dave Philipps, Judge in Maine Eases Restrictions on Nurse, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
31,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/01/us/ebola-maine-nurse-kacihickox.html.
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In the first lawsuit, Kaci Hickox returned to the United States from
Sierra Leone, where she had worked for Médecins Sans Frontières at an
279
Ebola treatment unit. In a widely publicized series of events, Hickox spent
nearly four days in isolation by order of the New Jersey Department of
280
Health, initially at Newark Liberty International Airport.
News reports
followed her subsequent removal to Maine where she remained confined to
281
her residence under an isolation order.
Hickox exhibited no symptoms
282
throughout her isolation and never developed Ebola.
While she was under a quarantine order in Maine, attorneys for Hickox
successfully sued the Maine Department of Health to modify the strict home
confinement. The quarantine order in Maine became the first, and so far
only, judicial modification of a public health order related to Ebola. A state
judge ruled that public health officials had not proved “by clear and
convincing evidence that limiting respondent’s movements to the degree
283
requested” was needed to protect the public. The modification eased the
most stringent aspect of the order—home seclusion for three weeks—while
retaining monitoring and social distancing aspects of the quarantine order
284
consistent with CDC recommendations.
Medical groups argued that
automatic quarantines of three weeks for persons displaying no symptoms
discouraged health care workers from traveling to Ebola-stricken
285
countries, while Maine and other states contended that such restrictions
286
were necessary to protect public health.
With the support of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), in late
2015 Hickox filed a lawsuit over her treatment in New Jersey, naming as
defendants Governor Chris Christie and the Commissioner of the New
287
Jersey Department of Health.
The lawsuit alleges that upon arriving at

279

280
281
282

283
284

285
286
287

Justin Wm. Moyer, Kaci Hickox, Rebel Ebola Nurse Loathed by Conservatives, Sues Chris Christie
over
Quarantine,
WASH.
POST:
MORNING
MIX
(Oct.
23,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/10/23/kaci-hickoxrebel-ebola-nurse-loathed-by-conservatives-sues-chris-christie-over-quarantine/?utm_term=
.2f7660fab7f1.
Hickox v. Christie, No. 15-7647 (KM), 2016 WL 4744181, at *1–2 (D. N.J. Sept. 9, 2016).
Price, supra note 263, at 500
Editorial, The Unfair Treatment of Ebola Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/opinion/the-unfair-treatment-of-ebolaworkers.html?_r=0 (reporting that even though more than 200 Ebola workers entered
voluntary quarantine, none of them developed Ebola).
Order Pending Hearing at 3, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. 2014-36 (D. Me., Oct. 31, 2014).
See Bidgood & Philipps, supra note 278 (noting that while the judge ordered Hickox to
“submit to daily monitoring for symptoms, to coordinate her travel with public health
officials and to notify them immediately if symptoms appear,” he also dismissed the most
restrictive impositions).
The Unfair Treatment of Ebola Workers, supra note 282.
Bidgood & Philipps, supra note 278.
Hickox v. Christie, No. 15-7647 (KM), 2016 WL 4744181, at *1 (D. N.J. Sept. 9, 2016).
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Newark Liberty International Airport, Hickox was taken into custody and
detained without medical grounds or legal justification for approximately 80
288
hours. Hickox also claims that Governor Christie made false statements to
289
news media implying that she showed symptoms of the disease.
Among
other comments, Governor Christie told news media that Hickox was
“obviously ill” and “I’m sorry if in any way she was inconvenienced but
inconvenience that could occur from having folks that are symptomatic and
290
ill out amongst the public is a much, much greater concern of mine.”
Unlike the Maine lawsuit, which sought modification of an existing public
health order, in this lawsuit Hickox seeks $250,000 in compensatory and
291
punitive damages.
In a second lawsuit, students working with Yale’s legal services
organization and the ACLU filed a class action against the governor of
Connecticut and state public health officials over the state’s treatment of
292
residents affected by Connecticut’s Ebola quarantine policies.
The
complaint seeks damages on behalf of Connecticut residents who were
quarantined for up to three weeks in fall 2014, with police officers posted
293
outside their residences. The complaint also argues that the court should
enjoin future such quarantines that might be imposed in an outbreak of the
294
Zika virus or other potential epidemics.
In response to medical experts
who had questioned the quarantine policy as unnecessary and politically
driven, the state’s infectious disease director wrote: “The quarantine
definition is very 19th century, making 21st-century quarantine options
295
difficult to implement.”
Both lawsuits claim violation of individual civil rights. While they do not
make structural preemption arguments on state versus federal authority,
echoes of the shotgun quarantine debates are clearly evident. Local
protectionism, allegedly tinged with some political grandstanding, motivated
the stricter and disproportionate quarantines of a class of travelers. Medical
necessity and the use of least restrictive settings for isolation, the standard
for due process, yielded to other interests. Similar to the nineteenth-century
response to yellow fever, the immediacy of a local health threat trumped
consideration of wider consequences. In our federal system, state and local
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governments alone determine exigency of protective action, inevitably
exhibiting a “safety first” bias in favor of their own residents. Governor
Christie has already suggested the potential use of quarantine for the Zika
296
virus in New Jersey, a move some experts characterize as “pointless.”

C. Syrian Refugees, Toxic Waste, and Other Perceived Threats to Local
Communities
This local protectionist bias in public health federalism, as exemplified
by the shotgun quarantine, is not unrelated to modern “home rule” and
“not in my backyard” ideology. Other historical examples abound,
including laws against vagrancy, fugitive slaves and the exclusion of free
persons of color in the antebellum South, the reaction to Chinese
immigrants in the late nineteenth century and the Chinese Exclusion Acts.
Modern manifestations include local objection to resettlement of Syrian
refugees (from a fear of terrorist infiltration) as well as to toxic waste
introduced from another state. The exclusion of perceived threats as a local
prerogative shares deep roots with the nineteenth-century shotgun
quarantine. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to examine these
issues in detail, I offer some brief observations. The lesson is not that the
Commerce Clause alone provides inherent federal supremacy in heath
emergencies, as I argue is the case for quarantine. But local protectionism
in defiance of a national interest has deep roots with modern resonance.
Take the controversy over the resettlement of Syrian refugees. As the
Syrian refugee crisis unfolded across Europe and the Middle East, a number
of state governors announced their intention to deny resettlement of Syrians
in their communities, contrary to a U.S. government plan to receive 10,000
refugees over the next year. They cited threats to public safety as
justification for this extraordinary invocation of the state’s traditional police
297
power.
Indeed, the State of Texas filed suit in federal court to keep Syrian
refugees out of the state. The state claims that federal officials violated the
Refugee Act of 1980, which requires the federal government to “consult
298
regularly” with states prior to resettlement.
As a state official
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Along with some other
characterized, “it is about protecting Texans.”
states, Texas prefers to seal its borders to refugees, who are lawful U.S
residents once resettled in any state. This refusal of initial resettlement
within the state ignores the fact that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
implies a right to travel or relocate from another state.
Then there is the dispute over trash and toxic waste disposal from out-ofstate sources. Local governments understandably are concerned with
becoming a dumping ground for waste generated elsewhere. Here the
Supreme Court has had much to say, even if the doctrinal underpinnings of
300
the Dormant Commerce Clause have been especially troubling.
Bans on
out-of-state waste disposal have been generally struck down in the name of
301
the Commerce Clause. In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, for example, a state
statute prohibited the importation of waste from outside the state. Although
the stated purpose of the statute was to protect “public health, safety, and
welfare,” the Supreme Court invalidated the statute because it discriminated
against out-of-state commercial interests, stating: “What is crucial is the
attempt by one State to isolate itself from a problem common to many by
302
erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade.”
Justice
Rehnquist, in dissent, pointed to the Quarantine Cases in justification of such
303
state action.
What these issues have in common is the urge to defend against outside
threats through “home rule,” whether it be contagious disease, toxic waste,
or terrorist infiltration. These are not inherently bad impulses, of course. I
do not suggest we risk a return of the local shotgun quarantine to keep these
threats out. Instead, I note them to highlight the ambiguity embedded in a
state’s right to protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its
inhabitants, set against a constitutional structure that historically has
privileged local boundaries in matters of quarantine. The shotgun
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quarantine evidenced a much larger but equally complicated issue. But, as
Justice Benjamin Cardozo noted in another context, the federal
Constitution “was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several
states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and
304
salvation are in union and not division.”

CONCLUSION
Can the federal government preempt state or local quarantines? The
question remains open today. This Article has examined the legislative
history of the shotgun quarantine to shed light on an enduring issue with
modern interest—local protectionism at the expense of national interest.
Human fear and human reactions affect how law is made and how it is
enforced. A “fear factor” played a prominent role in public response to
Ebola in the United States, as it certainly did with the widespread use of
geographic quarantine and martial law in Liberia and Sierra Leone. While
undeniably catastrophic in parts of western Africa, an Ebola epidemic in the
U.S. was extremely unlikely. Scientists worry more about new viruses that
305
easily spread through the air, unlike the transmission of Ebola. Such new
viruses, or mutations of old ones, could have the global reach and
306
devastation of the Spanish influenza in 1918. In this light, state and local
demand for independent quarantine authority is easily understood.
Historically, the shotgun quarantine pressed Congress to provide for
greater federal control of state and local quarantine. Although proponents
did not get all that they wanted from Congress, the advocacy of Southern
politicians, chambers of commerce, railroads and other business interests
nearly effected a much greater enlargement of federal government
authority. The U.S. Supreme Court invited Congress to extend intrastate
federal quarantine power by statute, but it has yet to do so.
Why did legislation authorizing federal intervention in local quarantines
fail when the need was clearly demonstrated and southern states dropped
objections to it, and even advocated in its favor? I have suggested that one
answer to this question lies in a failure of the political process in a nascent
era of agency development.
But the shotgun quarantine posed a
complicated problem because of a long history of exclusive state police
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power in matters of health, along with a Dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine that was in great disarray.
The term “shotgun quarantine,” incidentally, continued to be used in
other contexts in the early decades of the twentieth century. In 1908, for
example, the Washington Post applied the term in an article titled “Color
Line Drawn.”307 In a congressional debate over integration of train cars in
the District of Columbia, one member described discrimination in the South
308
as “a shotgun quarantine established . . . against negroes.”
The Chicago
Daily Tribune, tongue in cheek, applied the term to southern politics:
People must not be misled by the news that all shotgun quarantines in
the State of Mississippi have been withdrawn. This applies only so far as
yellow-fever is concerned.
The old shotgun quarantine against
309
Republican voters will be rigidly maintained.

The term “shotgun quarantine” is also still defined in some medical
dictionaries as “[t]he enforcing of a land quarantine by means of soldiers or
310
an armed guard.”
As I have written elsewhere, the unique brand of public health
federalism in the United States is an historical relic, surviving various
311
moments of strong centralizing forces. This Article has considered one of
the most significant of those moments. Primary authority in the realm of
public health still resides in state and local governments, with no significant
federal presence displacing that authority. The federal government is still
limited to a supporting role with respect to public health authority over
312
matters such as quarantine.
Because Congress never acted to quell the shotgun quarantine, we have
largely forgotten these legal debates over federal interstate authority. In
recovering that history, this Article offers a new perspective on how to
manage public health crises in our federal system, highlighting the need for
regulatory standards that could preempt an unnecessary and ill-advised local
quarantine. The particulars of any federal oversight of a public health
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emergency will still pose significant problems. As a Mississippi judge noted
more than a century ago, “Pestilence, like war, disrupts society, and silences
313
The yellow fever “shotgun quarantine” tested our constitutional
the law.”
structure for response to public health emergencies, and found it lacking.
This “federalism theater” is still evident today.
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